IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDREDTH FIRST CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

CONCLUSION OF THE VIENNA MEETING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

FEBRUARY 23, 1989

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CONCLUSION OF THE VIENNA MEETING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1989.

Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, at 2:30 p.m., Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, and Representative Steny H. Hoyer, Cochairman, presiding.

In attendance: Commissioners, Senators Alfonse D'Amato and James McClure; Representatives Dante B. Fascell, Bill Richardson, Edward Feighan, Don Ritter, Christopher H. Smith, Frank R. Wolf, and Hon. Richard Schifter from the Department of State.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DeCONCINI

Chairman DeConcini. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe will come to order.

On behalf of the members of the Helsinki Commission, I am very pleased to welcome our witnesses today, Ambassadors Warren Zimmermann and Stephen Ledogar, who will report on the results of the recently concluding Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting.

Much has occurred during the 2 years since our first witness, Ambassador Zimmermann, last appeared before the Commission. The general tenor of East-West relations has changed considerably. Some changes give cause for hope, others reinforce longstanding doubts. The Helsinki process in general, and the Vienna Meeting in particular, have contributed to this dynamic period, and rightly so, for change is what the Helsinki process is all about, the changing relationships between governments, their citizens, as well as between states.

Ambassador Zimmermann, his deputy, Bob Frowick, Sam Wise, our chief of staff here on the Commission, were guided by one basic goal, to improve human rights implementation. Their work has led to concrete results and a greater degree of actual performance by some participating States more than ever. Unfortunately, many concerns still persist.

There are, for example, more than 30 outstanding U.S.-Soviet bilateral cases, including the case of Sergei Petrov. There are also a dozen or so cases of dual nationals, U.S. citizens denied their right to leave the Soviet Union and return to the United States or go elsewhere. There are other cases such as that of Georgi Samoilivich, who is dying of cancer and has recently been refused permission to come to the West for urgent medical treatment, are still the victims of repression, policies which do not seem to have been changed by Vienna.

There is also continued concern for the over 130 individuals still imprisoned in the Soviet Union for their political or religious beliefs. These cases, many longstanding, must be resolved without further delay.

The Vienna Concluding Document itself contains more precise provisions than any previous CSCE document. Particularly noteworthy are those texts concerning religious freedoms, the rights of national minorities, freedoms of movement, the environment, and information. The document, like those which preceded it, will be used as a standard against which to measure the behavior of the participating States. For it is a demonstration of commitment which will give the document its true meaning.

The actions of some states, even as the document was being signed in Vienna, illustrates their insincerity when it comes to their Helsinki obligations. Since the signing of the Vienna documents, we have witnessed policy actions against individuals in Czechoslovakia, the detention of dissidents in Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic, continued repression in Romania, and arrest of Armenian activists. These actions stand in stark contrast to more positive developments elsewhere in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

From a military security perspective, significant progress was also made in Vienna, and I'm pleased to welcome Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, who led the U.S. mandate team for the Negotiation of Convention Forces in Europe which will open in Vienna in March. These talks, which will be held within the framework of the CSCE, will cover ground armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals and involve the 23 member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

While we welcome the prospects for movement in the military sphere, however I must repeat the Commission's continued concern that the U.S. pursue a balanced approach to the CSCE process, an approach which will in no way diminish the real propellant of this process, concrete progress in human rights.

[Prepared statement of Chairman DeConcini follows:]

Statement of Chairman Dennis DeConcini

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Conclusion of the Vienna Meeting and
Implications for U.S. policy

February 23, 1989, 2:30 - 4:30

On behalf of the members of the Helsinki Commission, I am pleased to welcome our witnesses, Ambassadors Warren Zimmermann and Stephen Ledogar to report on the results of the recently concluded Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. Much has occurred during the two years since our first witness, Ambassador Zimmermann, last appeared before this Commission. The general tenor of East-West relations has changed considerably. Some changes give cause for hope, others reinforce long-standing doubts. The Helsinki process in general, and the Vienna meeting in particular, have contributed to this dynamic period, and rightly so. For change is what the Helsinki process is all about -- the changing relationships between governments and their citizens as well as those between States.

Ambassador Zimmermann and his deputies, Bob Frowick and Sam Wise, were guided by one basic goal -- to improve human rights implementation. Their work has led to concrete results and a greater degree of actual performance by some participating states than ever before. Unfortunately, many concerns still persist. There are, for example, more than thirty outstanding U.S. - Soviet bilateral cases, including the case of Sergei Petrov . There are also a dozen or so cases of dual nationals -- U.S. citizens denied their right to return to America. Refuseniks such as Georgi Samoilivich who is dying of cancer and has recently been refused permission to come to the West for urgent medical treatment are still the victims of repressive policies which do not seem to have been changed by Vienna. There is also continued concern for the over 130 individuals still imprisoned in the Soviet Union for their political or religious beliefs. These cases, many long-standing, must be resolved without further delay.

The Vienna Concluding Document itself contains more precise provisions than any previous CSCE document. Particularly noteworthy are those texts covering religious freedom, the rights of national minorities, freedom of movement, the environment, and information. The document, like those which preceded it, will be used as a standard against which to measure the behavior of the participating States. For it is a demonstration of commitment which will give the document its true meaning. The actions of some States, even as the document was being signed in Vienna, illustrate their insincerity when it comes to their Helsinki obligations. Since the signing of the Vienna document, we have witnessed police actions against individuals in Czechoslovakia; the detention of dissidents in Bulgaria and the GDR; continued repression in Romania and; the arrest of Armenian activists. These actions stand in stark contrast to more positive developments elsewhere in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

From a military security perspective, significant progress was also made in Vienna. I am pleased to welcome Ambassador Stephen Ledogar who led the U.S. mandate team for the Negotiation on Conventional Forces in Europe which will open in Vienna in March. These talks, which will be held within the framework of the CSCE, will cover ground armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals and involve the 23 member States of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. While we welcome the prospect for movement in the military sphere however, I must repeat the Commission's continued concern that the United States pursue a balanced approach to the CSCE process -- an approach which will in no way diminish the real propellant of this process -- concrete progress in human rights. Co-Chairman Hoyer and I are planning to attend the opening sessions of the talks and have advised Secretary Baker that we look forward to the Commission's involvement in both of these meetings.

Ambassadors, it's a pleasure to welcome you and we look forward to hearing your assessment of the developments in Vienna and their impact on the future of the Helsinki process.

Chairman DeConcini. I'm pleased to yield to the distinguished Chairman, as far as I'm concerned, Mr. Hoyer. He has done an exemplary job over the last 2 years and I'm pleased that he's agreed to continue to be the active Cochairman that he has been in the past.

STATEMENT OF COCHAIRMAN HOYER

Cochairman Hoyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to join you in welcoming Ambassador Zimmermann and Ambassador Ledogar to this followup on the Vienna Review Conference. It was my pleasure to participate in the Vienna meetings as Vice Chairman of the U.S. delegation. In that capacity I had the privilege of addressing plenary sessions. A close working relationship between the Department and the Commission was forged throughout the course of the meeting. The Commission staff director, as you have mentioned, Sam Wise, served as deputy head of delegation, along with Bob Frowick.

We did not always see exactly eye-to-eye, as one would expect. These differences, however, never interfered with our shared objectives, improved human rights performance in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. During the course of the Vienna Meeting, members of the Commission visited each of the Warsaw Pact countries to gain a greater understanding of the complex issues and forces at work in Eastern Europe. Those were historic visits in that they were the first visits by the Commission as a commission. Obviously Members of Congress have visited before, but it was the first time that Members of Congress had been welcomed to these nations in their capacity as representatives of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In every country we visited, we met with private citizens to underscore our support for their work. And in meetings with officials, we stressed the need for concrete deeds and progress.

The human rights situation in several participating States improved since the opening of the Vienna Meeting. Many of those unjustly imprisoned for their political and religious beliefs have, in fact, been released. Many of those long denied their right to leave were finally granted exit permission. In other states, the human rights situation remained largely unchanged, unfortunately, and in at least one instance, the situation deteriorated even further.

I, of course, speak of Czechoslovakia where the playwright, Vaclav Havel, one of the leaders in the human rights movement and an individual who, Mr. Chairman, you and I have recommended for receipt of the Nobel Prize is imprisoned. Yesterday this Charter 77 co-founder, as all of us know, was convicted of incitement for his role in a peaceful demonstration and sentenced to 9 months in prison.

Recent action by a number of these countries, as Chairman DeConcini has pointed out, remind us that much work remains if performance is to come close to matching promise.

The Vienna Document, together with the human rights mechanism of the Conference on the Human Dimension, can, in my opinion, if used properly, foster substantial further progress. We at the Commission look forward to working closely with the Department in this regard. I concur with the concern raised by Chairman DeConcini over the issue of balance. I look forward to hearing from Ambassadors Zimmermann and Ledogar on the results of the Vienna Meeting and how we can continue to work to promote a process which can advance the rights of the individual as well as the overall security of Europe.

Mr. Chairman, I think it appropriate in these opening remarks to reiterate both the fact that the Department of State saw fit to include our executive director, Sam Wise, as deputy head of delegation. And as importantly, on a continuing basis, sought to consult with us as the meeting proceeded. I don't think there was a time that Ambassador Zimmermann was back in the United States that he did not seek to consult with you and I and other members of the Commission.

We appreciate that, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Ledogar, as well, took the opportunity when he was in the United States to keep us abreast of developments, to hear our concerns and suggestions. We think and hope that that was helpful to our U.S. delegation. As I said, there were times when we differed. There were times when we felt that we needed perhaps to be a little more adamant in our position. It is always easier, I understand, from afar, to judge the tactics than when you're on the scene.

It is my own belief, Mr. Chairman, that the final result in Vienna was a very positive one. It's my judgment that the controversy surrounding the Moscow Conference was a healthy one, our position was a healthy one, that ultimately, as I have said, and as Chairman Fascell, who is a member of the Commission has said, it was a matter of judgment as to when and if to agree to such a conference. It is my own view, and we're going to hear Ambassador Zimmermann comment on that I'm sure, that we can turn it to a positive note; that as the last element in the conferences on human dimension it will give us leverage to insure the performance that has been promised in Vienna.

So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to this hearing and I look forward to continuing to serve with you in the work that is going to be even more challenging in light of the 10 follow-up meetings that have now been scheduled.

Thank you.

Chairman DECONCINI. Chairman Hoyer, thank you.

[Prepared statement of Chairman Hoyer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CO-CHAIRMAN HOYER

Chairman DeConcini:

I am pleased to join you in welcoming Ambassadors Zimmermann and Ledogar back from the recently concluded Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting and mandate talks for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). It was my pleasure to participate in the Vienna meeting as Vice Chairman of the U.S. delegation. In that capacity I had the privilege of addressing plenary sessions of the 35 participating States on four occasions. A close working relationship between the Department and the Commission was forged throughout the course of the meeting -- with the Commission's Staff Director, Sam Wise, serving as deputy, along with Bob Frowick.

While we may not have seen eye-to-eye on everything, these differences never interfered with our shared objective -- improved human rights performance in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. During the course of the Vienna meeting members of the Commission visited each of the Warsaw Pact countries to gain a greater understanding of the complex issues and forces at work in Eastern Europe. In every country visited we met with private citizens to underscore our support for their work. And in meetings with officials we stressed the need for concrete deeds.

The human rights situation in several participating States improved since the opening of the Vienna meeting. Many of those unjustly imprisoned for their political or religious beliefs have been released. Many of those long denied their right to leave were finally granted exit permission. In other States the human rights situation remained largely unchanged and, in at least one instance, the situation deteriorated even further. Of particular concern is the treatment of Czechoslovak playwright and human rights activist Vaclav Havel. Yesterday this Charter 77 co-founder was convicted of "incitement" for his role in a peaceful demonstration and sentenced to nine months imprisonment. Recent actions by a number of these countries, as Chairman DeConcini has pointed out, remind us that much work remains if performance is to come close to matching promise.

The Vienna Concluding Document together with the human rights mechanism of the Conference on the Human Dimension can, if used properly, foster further progress. We at the Commission look forward to working closely with the Department in this regard. I concur with the concern raised by Chairman DeConcini over the issue of balance. I look forward to hearing from Ambassadors Zimmermann and Ledogar on the results of the Vienna meeting and how we can continue to work, together, to promote a process which can advance the rights of the individual as well as the overall security of Europe.

Chairman DeConcini. We're going to recognize people as they came in. I'm going to yield now to Senator McClure.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES McCLURE

Senator McClure. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I very much appreciate your appearance here, Ambassadors. I look forward to your testimony.

I'll be very brief. I was very privileged to have been in Vienna at the time of the signing of these agreements. I note the statements that you have made here today, and the leadership that you have given us there. I very much appreciate what was done.

As is no surprise to anyone, I really was very skeptical of the Helsinki Final Accords in terms of what they would produce for the West. It was very obvious what they produced for the East. What we got out of it was a process, with some pledges for improvement in human rights and better cooperation between nations on both sides of the East-West divide. What we get out of it will depend on how well that process is used.

I happened to be in Vienna because Senator Hatfield and I had been in the Eastern bloc countries just prior to that time, in Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia. I was not privileged to meet Mr. Havel when we were there. We did meet with a group of dissidents, but Mr. Havel was then in hiding, waiting for the demonstrations that were being planned in Prague. He was fearful that he would be picked up by the security police to prevent him taking part in those public demonstrations.

But it was also very apparent from talking to other dissidents in Prague that they anticipated very accurately what was going to occur. They were willing to pay the price of their participation, and they are now paying that price, with a courage that shames and humbles all of us. There are people in those countries that will consciously make decisions that bring pain to themselves and to their families in order to make the statements that we do with such ease here. I can't help but express my determination that the sacrifices that they make, in order to further the process of human freedom, not be lost because of our inattention. What we do is so very much easier than what they are called upon to do.

I'm also insistent that we can continue this process, because I believe that it is producing results, thanks to you gentlemen and your negotiating teams. The document signed in Vienna was and is a remarkable document. I just hope that everyone who hasn't yet seen it, hasn't taken the time to read it, will get copies and read it carefully for what it says, for the undertakings that are contained in it, and for what it means to us in terms of our diligence in seeing that those countries that initialed this document are not free to ignore the undertakings that they signed.

I think it is, in that process, a significant advancement of the hopes for peace as well as that for human dignity and freedom throughout Eastern Europe. How well we do our job may well determine how significant this document is because without follow-up it is nothing, it is only words on paper.

I couldn't help but note too that as we were there, and as you observed, Mr. Ambassadors, the Romanian Government attempted immediately after the ratification of the document to distance themselves from it. I think it was fair to say something that doesn't appear in the record. That was the visible reaction of almost everyone in the room as Romania said, "Well, yes, it's a good document and we agree to it, but we're not bound by it." We all remember the audible reactions throughout the room: "Oh, no you don't. You don't get away with that."

That's remarkable in a number of respects, not the least of which 35 nations including the Holy See were there, and 34 of the 35 said, "You did something when you signed it. You agreed to something when you initialed it. You will be expected to comply in the future."

That, I think, gives us a very firm ground for the continuing dialogue that we had with Czechoslovakia today on the repression of the dissidents in the country. Just before they signed, those demonstrations started. Just after they signed, they continued. We have a perfect right to say, "Wait a minute, you made a commitment." That's not an interference in their internal affairs, it is a recognition that they, by agreement in the international forum, committed themselves to certain obligations which they are now violating.

I think it is incumbent on us to followup by saying, "We expect you to abide by your commitments."

I guess it's also fair to say there are setbacks in that process. Recent actions in Czechoslovakia are an admission of that. But the agreement as a whole is also a net gain, I think, and we have to continue to press for further gains.

I also don't want to ignore the parallel, represented by Ambassador Ledogar's presence here, between the human rights talks and the conventional arms talks, because I think they're of equal importance. In the past, these talks have not reached concrete results, but in the new CFE talks, at least the foundation has now been laid for attaining some concrete results. It is in that context that I welcome the opportunity to hear both of you today and to cheer you on towards greater activities and success.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DeConcini. The Chair will now recognize the ranking member on the Senate side, the former Chairman and a very active member, Senator D'Amato.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO

Senator D'Amato. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time, I'm going to ask that my complete statement be submitted for the record in its entirety.

Chairman DeConcini. Without objection.

Senator D'Amato. I want to take this occasion to welcome Ambassador Zimmermann and Ambassador Ledogar. It's good to see both of them again.

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I didn't note that this is the first hearing of the Commission for the 101st Congress.

Certainly I'd like to extend my best wishes and congratulations to our former Chairman and your Cochairman, Congressman Hoyer, for the outstanding job that he did during the 100th Congress in leading this Commission in the way that put the interest of human rights and human dignity first. It advanced our purposes in a most unique way and a bipartisan way, that brought about, I think, a recognition from the administration and the State Department of our concerns.

We look forward to your continued leadership and certainly we look forward to your able Cochairman who has now assumed the duty as Chairman, Senator DeConcini, to continue that leadership. I know it's going to be one that advances the causes of peace and human rights.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Senator D'Amato.

[The prepared statement of Senator Alfonse D'Amato follows:]

16 MARCH 1989

SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO
OPENING STATEMENT
HELSINKI COMMISSION HEARING ON THE LONDON INFORMATION FORUM

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I WANT TO THANK YOU AND OUR DISTINGUISHED CO-CHAIRMAN FOR ARRANGING THIS IMPORTANT HEARING ON THE FIRST OF THE POST-VIENNA HELSINKI PROCESS MEETINGS. IT CONTINUES THE COMMISSION'S WELL-ESTABLISHED PRACTICE OF HOLDING A HEARING BEFORE EACH MEETING AS WELL AS A SECOND HEARING AFTER THE MEETING TO ASSESS WHAT HAPPENED.

INSTEAD OF RECEIVING OFFICIAL VIEWS AS IS MOST OFTEN THE CASE BEFORE A HELSINKI PROCESS MEETING, TODAY'S HEARING WILL SOLICIT THE COMMENTS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON THE ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED AT THE LONDON INFORMATION FORUM. TODAY'S WITNESSES CAN SHED LIGHT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE SIGNATORY STATES AND HELP POINT THE WAY INTO THE FUTURE.

THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE WILL BE, AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST, THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION. THIS SEEMS ELEMENTARY TO MOST AMERICANS, BECAUSE WE HAVE GROWN UP IN A SOCIETY IN WHICH THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION IS REGARDED AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF ALL CITIZENS AND AN ESSENTIAL FOUNDATION FOR A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO
16 MARCH 1989

NOT EVERYONE IN THE WORLD IS AS FORTUNATE AS WE ARE. THINGS WE WOULD NOT -- AND DO NOT -- TOLERATE HERE HAPPEN TOO FREQUENTLY IN OTHER COUNTRIES. IN PARTICULAR, IN MOST WARSAW PACT STATES, THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION IS AN UNKNOWN IDEAL. SOME COUNTRIES ARE WORSE IN THEIR INFORMATION PRACTICES THAN OTHERS.

THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN THE EAST BLOC IN RECENT YEARS. THE SOVIET UNION, LONG THE LEADING OFFENDER, LAST YEAR CEASED JAMMING FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS. ALSO, INTERNAL SOVIET MEDIA HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE FREE TO DISCUSS ISSUES AND DISSEMINATE INFORMATION.

BUT ALL IS NOT ROSY. EVEN THOUGH THE FORMAL CENSORSHIP PROCESS HAS ENDED, EXCEPT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION STILL UNQUESTIONABLY MANAGES AND CONTROLS WHAT APPEARS IN THE PRESS. INDEED, LOOSENING CONTROLS ON THE DOMESTIC MEDIA WAS A KEY COMPONENT OF GORBACHEV'S REFORMS. THAT LOOSENING, AND THE DISCUSSION IT PERMITS, IS CALLED "GLASNOST."

WE MUST NOT FORGET, HOWEVER, THAT GLASNOST IS NOT A SOVIET FIRST AMENDMENT. IT IS A CALCULATED STEP BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY TO ASSIST WITH PARTY-GUIDED AND CONTROLLED REFORM OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THOSE WHO DO NOT SUPPORT THE

PARTY LINE -- LIKE THE JOURNAL "GLASNOST" AND ITS PUBLISHER -- SOON FEEL THE WRATH OF THE SOVIET STATE.

ALSO, FOREIGN JOURNALISTS REMAIN UNDER SOVIET CONTROL IN CRUCIAL WAYS. THEIR CAREERS DEPEND UPON SUCCESS IN MOSCOW, AND BEING EXPELLED -- OR HAVING THEIR ACCESS LIMITED AFTER OVERZEALOUS REPORTING -- WILL HARM THEIR PROSPECTS IN THEIR OWN ORGANIZATIONS AND COUNTRIES. THUS, THERE IS PRESSURE FOR SELF-CENSORSHIP AND LIMITED EFFORTS TO REACH DIFFICULT OR CONTROVERSIAL SOURCES OR WRITE OR BROADCAST ON SUBJECTS THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WOULD FIND SENSITIVE.

THESE CONDITIONS, HOWEVER, ARE NO LONGER THE WORST FACING EITHER DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS IN THE EAST BLOC. ARGUABLY, CONDITIONS IN ROMANIA AND IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE NOW WORSE THAN IN THE SOVIET UNION.

JAILINGS, EXPULSIONS, CONTINUED STRICT CENSORSHIP, AND TIGHT OFFICIAL CONTROL OVER JOURNALISM REMAIN IN PLACE. INDEED, WHEN THESE CONTROLS ARE CHALLENGED BY PERSONS CITING GORBACHEV'S CHANGES IN SOVIET PRACTICES, THE AUTHORITIES CRACK DOWN HARD AND SWIFTLY.

THE LONDON FORUM HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SOME MUCH NEEDED WORK, EVEN FOLLOWING SO SOON AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE VIENNA MEETING. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM OUR DISTIN-

GUISHED PANEL OF WITNESSES REGARDING WHAT THEY THINK IT CAN AND SHOULD ACCOMPLISH.

THANK YOU.

Chairman DeConcini. Now I want to recognize the Congressman of Ohio who has been a very active member and on the Commission a long time, Ed Feighan.

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EDWARD FEIGHAN

Representative Feighan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very much welcome our two very distinguished witnesses today and the occasion to thank both Ambassador Zimmermann and Ambassador Ledogar for the outstanding work that they have done on our behalf.

The Vienna Document has drawn a great deal of public interest, ranging from the very controversial topics that some of my colleagues have spoken to, such as the Moscow Meeting and the reaction of the Romanians stating their intent to disregard some portions of the document.

I think that this hearing will help give us the focus that we need to anticipate what the implications will be for American policy as we see the implementation of the document over the next several years.

Again, welcome, and thank you again for the tremendous contributions which you've made.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DeConcini. The Chair will now recognize the Ranking Minority Member of the House, Don Ritter from Pennsylvania, a very active member.

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE DON RITTER

Representative Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a great pleasure to be here with my colleagues today. It's a pleasure not only because of the importance of this meeting, but also, Mr. Chairman, it is your first hearing as Chairman of the Commission. I look forward to working with you. I think we've both benefited by the leadership of our colleague, Mr. Hoyer. I want to commend him for an excellent job.

I'm going to ask that my statement be placed in the record in its entirety.

Chairman DeConcini. Without objection.

Representative Ritter. I would like to add that the Helsinki Commission has had a real impact on the changes that we're witnessing in the Eastern bloc today. I really believe that the cutting edge of this country's human rights involvement has been the Helsinki process, the Helsinki Commission, the meetings held in Belgrade and Vienna. I think we were able to get our message across over this period of time. I think we have some great challenges ahead of us. The road is still to be traveled upon. But as we turn over the gavel to our new Chairman, I think we, with some pride in our achievement, can look back and use that achievement as a base for the further accomplishments in the future.

I welcome the two distinguished Ambassadors to the witness table today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DeConcini. Thank you, Congressman Ritter.

[The prepared statement of Representative Don Ritter follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DON RITTER

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

FEBRUARY 23, 1989

THE VIENNA CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND U.S. POLICY

MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM PLEASED TO BE HERE TODAY NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC UNDER DISCUSSION, BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT IS YOUR FIRST HEARING AS CHAIRMAN OF THIS COMMISSION. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE ALL BENEFITTED FROM MR. HOYER'S TENURE AS CHAIRMAN, AND I LOOK FORWARD AS RANKING HOUSE MINORITY MEMBER TO WORKING WITH YOU ON ISSUES IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP WHICH ARE SO VITALLY IMPORTANT FOR ALL OF US AS AMERICANS.

I THINK WE CAN ALL APPLAUD THE SUCCESS OF OUR NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA. AS WE WILL NO DOUBT HEAR FROM OUR DISTINGUISHED WITNESSES TODAY, THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS SERVED AS A FORUM FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OUR WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES TO HIGHLIGHT VIOLATIONS OF EXISTING CSCE PROVISIONS IN OTHER SIGNATORY STATES. OUR NEGOTIATORS BROUGHT HOME TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES THAT FOR THE UNITED STATES, GUARANTEEING THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL ARE THE PARAMOUNT GOAL. IT IS ON THIS BASE

THAT ALL OF OUR POLICIES AND POSITIONS REST, AND I AM EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN HEARING JUST WHAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN SOLVING SOME OF THE LONGSTANDING CASES OF VIOLATIONS IN THE EASTERN BLOC.

THE VIENNA AGREEMENT DEMONSTRATES THAT NEW GROUND CAN BE BROKEN WHEN BOTH SIDES ARE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. THE ADVENT OF MR. GORBACHEV AND *PERESTROIKA* IN THE SOVIET UNION DEMONSTRATES THAT THERE IS A NEW FLEXIBILITY ON THE EASTERN SIDE WITH REGARD TO CSCE. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT PROGRESS TOWARD FULFILLMENT OF CSCE COMMITMENTS IS BEING MADE IN AT LEAST SOME PROBLEMATIC SIGNATORY STATES. MUCH OF THIS CHANGE CAME ABOUT AS THE TALKS THEMSELVES WERE GOING ON, AND HAS MADE FOR A GREAT DEAL OF QUESTIONING ON BOTH SIDES AS TO WHAT EFFECT REFORM IN THE EAST WILL ULTIMATELY HAVE IN THE CSCE PROCESS. I SUSPECT THAT THIS QUESTION IS BEING ASKED AT LEAST AS FREQUENTLY IN WARSAW, PRAGUE AND MOSCOW AS IT IS IN LONDON, BONN AND WASHINGTON.

IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT REFORM IN THE EAST HAS COME TO BE A HIGHLY LOCALIZED EVENT. REFORM AND COMPLIANCE WITH HELSINKI FINAL ACT PROVISIONS SEEM MUCH FURTHER ALONG, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE SOVIET UNION THAN IN OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SUCH AS ROMANIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IN FACT, AT THE VERY

TIME THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT WAS SIGNING THE VIENNA DOCUMENT, ITS INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS WAS BUSY AT HOME ARRESTING AND INCARCERATING SOME OF THAT COUNTRY'S MOST VOCAL CSCE SUPPORTERS. WHILE THERE IS CHANGE IN THE EAST, IT MUST BE OUR GOAL TO ENSURE THAT REFORM AND COMPLIANCE WITH CSCE IS BROADENED ACROSS ALL OF EUROPE TO INCLUDE ALL SIGNATORY STATES. I HOPE THAT IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER CSCE AUSPICES WE WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH EVEN MORE THAN WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN VIENNA. CERTAINLY THERE IS MORE TO BE DONE.

IN THE CSCE PROCESS, THE WEST HAS PERHAPS A UNIQUE FORUM FOR TESTING THE CONCRETE EFFECT OF GORBACHEV'S REFORM RHETORIC ON THE DAY-TO-DAY LIVES OF THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN POPULATION. IF THE EAST IS SERIOUS ABOUT BROAD REFORMS WHICH FREE UP THE INDIVIDUAL TO BE THE CREATIVE BEING HE IS MEANT TO BE, THEN IT IS IN MEETINGS LIKE VIENNA AND ITS FOLLOW-UP NEGOTIATIONS THAT EVIDENCE WILL BE FOUND. I THINK THAT IT IS CRUCIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO BE GRATEFUL FOR CHANGE WHEN IT OCCURS, BUT ALSO THAT WE PRESS FOR CHANGE WHERE THERE IS NONE AS YET.

THIS IS CERTAINLY AN APPROPRIATE JUNCTURE IN THE CSCE PROCESS TO BE HOLDING HEARINGS OF THIS SORT. BEFORE WE MOVE INTO FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS MANDATED

BY THE VIENNA DOCUMENT WE MUST ALL BE SURE THAT WE ARE ON THE RIGHT PATH, AND THAT WE ARE WORKING TOGETHER AS MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMINISTRATION, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS. I THANK BOTH AMBASSADOR ZIMMERMANN AND AMBASSADOR LEDOGAR FOR JOINING US TODAY, AND LOOK FORWARD TO THEIR TESTIMONY.

Chairman DeConcini. I will now yield to the distinguished member of the Commission who traveled to the Soviet Union, and worked tirelessly there, Mr. Richardson from New Mexico.

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BILL RICHARDSON

Representative Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join in commending both Ambassador Zimmermann and Ambassador Ledogar for their role in the Helsinki process. I am most heartened by the very strong, positive human rights language in the Concluding Document. Now we have to make sure it's implemented.

Let me also thank the outgoing Chairman, Steny Hoyer, both for putting me on this Commission, and as I was reappointed this morning, for my reappointment. I want to especially commend him for his tireless leadership on an issue that I know he's spent a lot of time on. Having worked with Senator DeConcini, now Chairman, I know that the leadership of this Commission is again in excellent hands. As Don Ritter has said, "I think the reason we're effective is because we're bipartisan."

I think I've said enough and that may have been too much. I want to thank my colleagues from the Senate for their enormous role over the years.

Chairman DeConcini. Thank you, Congressman.

I think a word has to be said about Dante Fascell. I don't think this Commission would be what it is today if it weren't for his leadership, first putting it together, issuing the necessary support on the House side and the Senate side to see it created and see it flourish. I'm very pleased that the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House can be with us today.

Mr. Chairman?

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE DANTE B. FASCELL

Representative Fascell. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'm delighted to have been reappointed. This is a Commission which is certainly close to my heart. The issues with which we deal are of great concern to all of us and are important to the foreign policy of the United States. For all those reasons, I'm glad to have been reappointed under your chairmanship and to have the public opportunity to thank Steny Hoyer for the outstanding job that he did as Chairman of the Commission.

Passing the torch on is a very important process in our organization because continuity is extremely meaningful. One thing that we have had through the bipartisan chairmanships has been the kind of continuity that allows us to be effective.

It's also been a pleasure to have worked with our ambassadors and with the administration on this, in spite of early reservations that some had in this country with respect to the effectiveness or the desirability of a commission structure, a creature that was relatively new to both the administration and the Congress. I think it can honestly be said that the Commission—the administration and the Congress together— and that of course includes you two distinguished Ambassadors, has really made a difference. For the part that we as Americans have played, I think that we should all be very proud of the fact that we have been of some help to other people who otherwise might not have had that help.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate those remarks and wholeheartedly support them, and assure you that we intend that same process to continue.

Ambassadors, finally, we are most pleased to have both of you here. Your records speak for themselves. I'm not going to read the biographical background that we have here. We'll put them in the record for posterity because they are impressive.

Ambassador Zimmermann, we know that you are leaving this post and going on to Yugoslavia, but you're not going to get rid of us because we may come visit you perhaps even this year.

I welcome you both and I will call on Ambassador Zimmermann at this time.

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR WARREN ZIMMERMANN, CHAIRMAN, U.S. DELEGATION TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cochairman Hoyer, Mr. former Chairman D'Amato, and Mr. former Chairman Fascell, and members, it seems a long time but it was only September 11, 1986 when I last testified to the Commission under Senator D'Amato's chairmanship. It was just before the Vienna Meeting began and I said that we had two major objectives at Vienna. The first was improved compliance with commitments and particularly human rights commitments. The second was balanced progress, which we defined as making sure that human rights got an equal shake with security and the other elements of the CSCE.

I thought in my brief remarks it might just be useful to look at those objectives and see where they stand as Vienna has now ended.

I think if you compare the record of compliance today with where it stood in 1986, it can be seen that some fairly dramatic things were accomplished. In the Soviet Union, for example, the release of some 600 political prisoners, the reduction of bilateral cases from 150 down to a number of about 10 as Chairman DeConcini has said. Of course that's too many still. At least it was reduced. The rise in Jewish emigration from 1,000 in the year 1986 to about 20,000 in the year 1988, and even more dramatic rises in the emigration of Armenians and Germans from the Soviet Union. The end of jamming in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The enormously increased travel throughout the Soviet bloc, including, perhaps most dramatically, in the GDR where 7 million East Germans last year were able to visit the West.

All those things were achieved in a 2-year period, but the picture is still mixed. I was very glad to hear all the Commissioners in their statements make reference to the fact that there's still an enormous amount of work still to be done. If you take the Soviet Union, of course, there are still people who are imprisoned for their beliefs. There are bilateral cases that are unsolved. There are refuseniks who are not able to leave the country. The case of

Czechoslovakia has been commented on. It is particularly egregious in view of the timing of the police action by the Czech authorities against people who were simply trying to express the rights which were vouchsafed for them in the Helsinki, the Madrid and the Vienna Documents. And Romania.

I was very sad and glad to hear Chairman DeConcini refer to Sergei Petrov in the Soviet Union. He's a man I have had as a friend since 1981. Last week I opened a photographic exhibit of Petrov's photographs in American University in this city. I reminded the audience there of the fact that this is the one divided spouse that over a 7-year period has not been able to emigrate.

That's why I like to refer to the Vienna Meeting and the conclusion of the Vienna Meeting as a beginning rather than an end, because there is a lot of unfinished work to do. I share, as I know all of us in the Department of State and the executive branch share the concerns expressed by the Commission members about the work that remains to be done.

On the second point, balanced progress, we had a very complex problem in Vienna because there was going to be a larger security element in the CSCE process than we had ever had before. First of all, the Stockholm Meeting ended just before the Vienna Meeting began. There was the need to continue the work of Stockholm and to express that continuation in our final document.

Second, an issue which you will hear more about from Ambassador Ledogar, there was the tricky issue of the mandate of the CFE, which was to be in the framework of the CSCE process.

I think in this military security problem with regard to human rights, we were able to preserve balance. I don't think any problem was more difficult for Ambassador Ledogar and myself than to fight for the autonomy of the conventional stability talks. Not only to insure that those talks could proceed as a genuine arms control negotiation, but also to protect the CSCE process from being dominated by a security component, a concern which was expressed many times by Chairman Hoyer and by many other members of the Commission as the Vienna Meeting unfolded.

I think balance was also preserved because of the improvements in compliance that I mentioned. I think it was preserved also with regard to the document which was achieved at Vienna. We broke new ground in the document on freedom of movement, on the right to leave, on bars to emigration, particularly the abuse of secrecy provisions by the Soviet Union and East Germany and other countries, on remedies for those who were denied the right to travel abroad, on time limits for resolving applications for travel abroad, on the rights of Helsinki monitors, on the jamming of the radios, on religious freedom, and on the rapid and unhindered delivery of mail.

I think Senator McClure is quite right to call our attention to the fact that these are words on paper and unless they're given life they remain words on paper. I still believe it was worthwhile to fight as we did and to take the time that we had to take to get those words on paper. They don't prevent violation, and indeed we saw in the Czech and the Romanian example that violations came very quickly. But they drive up the cost for those countries which violate, the cost in their public image, the cost in their relations with other countries. I think that's an important sanction and an important piece of leverage.

Finally, a fourth point on balance. The follow-up meetings which will come after Vienna. While they don't, in the amount of days spent, add up to the amount of time that will be spent on arms control issues, they nevertheless have a very heavy focus on human rights issues and on issues related to human rights.

If you take the 10 nonmilitary post-Vienna meetings and add to them the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, which will happen in the spring of 1992, you find that 6 of those 11 meetings have to do with human rights specifically or indirectly: three meetings on human rights, in Paris, Copenhagen, and Moscow; a meeting on information in London; a meeting on culture in Poland; and, of course, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting itself, which by past practice will be heavily devoted, particularly in its review of implementation phase, to human rights.

So, I think the balance is there.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I can't conclude without saying how much of a debt we owe to the Commission; to Chairman Hoyer, who was Chairman of the Commission through most of the life of the Vienna Meeting; to Senator D'Amato, who was the Chairman at the beginning; and to you, Senator DeConcini, for the enormous help that these leaders and that the Commission have given the delegation.

And, of course, we are a unique delegation in having as full members and active members, staff members from the Commission, including Ambassador Sam Wise, who was our deputy throughout the life of the Vienna Meeting and did a superb job in leading the human rights aspect of our work; and all of the Commission staff members who served on our delegation, with great distinction, with great talent and with great dedication. I think they're a credit to the Commission. They're a credit to the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Warren Zimmermann follows:]

Prepared Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
before the CSCE Commission
February 23, 1989

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to appear before the Commission.

Vienna proved to be a long and arduous -- but ultimately very fruitful -- negotiation, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the many people in the State Department, the Defense Department and the other government agencies who worked so hard to make Vienna a success. I would also like to give special thanks to the Commission for the role it played in providing advice and support to the delegation, in particular key contributions by Commission Staff director Sam Wise and other members of the Commission Staff who worked so hard on human rights and other issues.

I think the results of the Vienna meeting speak for themselves. We achieved our basic objectives, and our initial expectations were exceeded in virtually every area. The foundation laid in Vienna -- including the new human rights commitments and the schedule for human rights follow-up meetings -- creates favorable opportunities for keeping the pressure on the East on human rights, as well as for pursuing the U.S. agenda on military security and economic cooperation issues.

Human Rights

The U.S. had three broad human rights objectives in mind when the Vienna CSCE follow-up Meeting began in November 1986:

-- Improved Eastern human rights performance and improved implementation of CSCE human rights commitments;

-- The expansion and strengthening of existing CSCE human rights commitments in order to raise even higher the standards by which Soviet and Eastern European behavior would be judged;

-- Focussed follow-up activity on human rights in order to keep the pressure on the East for better implementation.

Our principal human rights objective in Vienna was improved performance on the part of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. The U.S. delegation, joined by our NATO Allies and many like-minded neutral delegations, hit the Soviets and their allies often and hard on their violations of CSCE human rights commitments. Of course, what we said and did in Vienna was not the main incentive for Eastern changes, but the constant public exposure of Eastern human rights violations in Vienna was certainly a factor in Eastern decisionmaking processes.

It is significant that the Soviets and some of their allies undertook major human rights reforms while under the public scrutiny of the Vienna meeting. Positive changes included (among others):

- Over 600 of the approximately 750 Soviet political prisoners on our list, including all Helsinki monitors, were released;
- Bilateral U.S.-Soviet cases were reduced to about 10, down from more that 150 in November 1986;
- Emigration rates for Jews, ethnic Germans, Armenians and others from the USSR are up dramatically;
- Jamming of foreign radio broadcasts in the USSR and Eastern Europe was ended;
- Travel for Hungarians and Poles was liberalized, and eased travel restrictions by the GDR permitted unprecedented numbers of East Germans to travel to the West.

In addition to pursuing improved implementation, we were also looking for ways to make the CSCE a more effective forum for achieving our human rights goals in the future. Thus we sought a concluding document which strengthened and expanded existing CSCE commitments and which provided for a strong agenda of post-Vienna human rights follow-up activities.

Although we must remain wary of putting text before behavior, there are two aspects of the Vienna document which we think will lead to better performance:

- First, the sharper standards of the Vienna document give citizens, officials, and governments such as our own better grounds to challenge illegitimate practices;
- Second, the series of follow-up meetings and the mechanisms available to all participating states provide high profile public fora for challenging abusive practices and for keeping after governments which do not perform.

The Vienna Concluding Document contains significant new standards that go beyond Helsinki and Madrid. Loopholes have been closed and gaps in the treatment of some human rights principles -- such as freedom of movement -- have been filled. It commits the participating states to (among other things):

- Respect the rights of those observing and promoting the implementation of CSCE commitments (i.e., Helsinki monitors);
- Permit direct and normal reception of foreign radio broadcasts;
- Respect religious freedom, including the right to religious education in the language of one's choice,

the right to establish and maintain places of worship, and the right to distribute religious material;

- Respect the privacy and integrity of postal and telecommunications services;
- Observe specific time limits for resolving applications for family reunification and emergency travel.

The Vienna Concluding Document also provides for three human rights follow-up meetings, all of which will keep the human dimension of the CSCE process in the public eye. This will amount to one per year leading up to the next general review conference in Helsinki in 1992, as compared to two meetings which took pace between the Madrid and Vienna meetings. The meetings, which will be held in Paris (1989), Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow (1991), will focus on the implementation of CSCE commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms. For the first time, all governments hosting CSCE follow-up meetings have pledged to conduct those meetings in an atmosphere of access and openness. Hosts are committed to provide access for foreign journalists, non-governmental organizations, and individuals. They are also committed to allow their citizens unimpeded contact with delegates and visitors.

The Vienna meeting also created a mechanism enabling any CSCE member to raise any human rights issue with any other member at any time. This is particularly significant for smaller NATO and neutral states, which, unlike the U.S., do not have established channels for confronting the East on human rights issues. This mechanism, combined with the three human rights meetings, gives us a continuous process of human rights review.

Military Security

In the area of military security, agreement was reached in Vienna to hold a follow-on to the Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures. In the two years since its inception, the regime embodied in the Stockholm Document has proven to be a significant achievement, indeed. Virtually all member states have participated in or conducted observation programs and the concept of inspection, initially treated with great delicacy, has now become almost routine. We agreed in Vienna that the record of implementation, while brief, has been acceptable.

Against this background, we were eager to gain agreement on follow-on talks to Stockholm. This did not prove difficult to achieve, since virtually all participating states shared the same objective. The final document contains an excellent mandate for discussions which will begin in Vienna in March.

In an associated, non-CSCE negotiation, agreement was also reached among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE). The principal Alliance objective in this area was to shape the mandate for the CFE, which we had agreed would take place within the framework of the 35-nation CSCE process, in a manner that fully protected the autonomy of the 23. We obtained the mandate language we needed, and are looking forward to the beginning of the CFE talks in early March, alongside the renewed Stockholm-style effort at 35 on CSBMs. Indeed, details of the future 23/35 relationship were successfully worked out both in the CFE mandate and in the military security section of the Vienna Concluding Document.

Basket II

In the area of economic cooperation (Basket II), we obtained agreement regarding the publication of more detailed economic information and statistics of the sort that will help facilitate Western business ventures in Warsaw Pact countries. We also successfully resisted efforts to reduce Basket II to narrow economic questions. We believe Basket II has -- and must maintain — a substantial element of expanding the scope for human contacts between East and West. In this connection, the Vienna Concluding Document contains new commitments on the human rights of scientists, unofficial economic activists, and for tourists.

Conclusion

Vienna played a major role in achieving U.S. objectives. No one could have predicted in 1986 the progress in implementation that has been made or that the East would agree to the extensive new commitments embodied in the Vienna Concluding Document.

Yet our job is only half done. Our challenge is to make the most of the opportunities we have created to advance the human rights agenda. We have to be realistic about how far there is to go. The recent repression and prosecution of demonstrators in Prague is a vivid reminder of that, as is the overall deplorable human rights situation in Romania. And, for all the improvements that have taken place in the Soviet Union, the Soviets still have a long way to go to achieve full compliance with the many human rights agreements to which they are party.

Chairman DECONCINI. Ambassador Ledogar?

AMBASSADOR STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm also very grateful for the opportunity to appear here today. My only other appearance before the Commission was about a year ago and it was more informal, although we did have a record at the time.

This is a very promising juncture in the field of conventional arms control. The conclusion last month of a mandate for a new negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe, which we're going to call CFE, has set the stage for the NATO allies to test Soviet willingness to lower the level of East-West military confrontation and enhance security and stability through a binding arms control agreement covering Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

As you know, agreement to the mandate by the 23 states which will participate in the new talks, the NATO allies and the Warsaw Pact countries, was a key element in the conclusion of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting, as my colleague, Ambassador Zimmermann, has just pointed out.

In this regard, I can recall the concern of many veterans of the CSCE process that negotiations on the mandate might tip the CSCE balance unacceptably toward security issues at the expense of human rights. We did not allow this to happen. The human rights section of the Vienna Document, as you members of the Commission have just pointed out, contain unprecedented achievements. Indeed, the East's interest in clearing the way for new conventional arms talks was an important part of the West's leverage for getting commitments which met our own CSCE agenda.

With the Vienna Meeting behind us, and the 23 participants preparing for the opening of the CFE talks on March 9, this is a logical time to look again at the relationship between conventional arms negotiations and the CSCE. Talks on conventional armed forces in Europe will be an autonomous negotiation, conducted within the framework of the CSCE process. This relationship reflects the reality that it is the armed forces of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance and of the parties to the Warsaw Pact that bear most immediately on the essential security relationship in Europe.

At the same time, it is not just the members of the two European military alliances, but all 35 CSCE participating States that have an interest in the issues we will be discussing.

The 23 countries participating in the CFE talks will determine their own agenda, their own pace and objectives, and will be solely responsible for determining the outcome of the negotiation.

However, on the other hand, representatives of the CFE, the conventional force negotiations, will meet regularly with the 12 European neutral and non-aligned states for an update on CFE progress. The 23, furthermore, have pledged to take the views of the other CSCE states concerning their own security into consideration in the CFE negotiation. The next CSCE Follow-up Meeting in

Helsinki in 1992 will provide an opportunity to exchange views on progress in the conventional arms talks.

These arrangements, which all 35 CSCE states have agreed on, insure that members of the two alliances can negotiate confidentially, out of the limelight, and without pressure from other issues or artificial deadlines. Given that the negotiations will be dealing with core aspects of our national defenses, it is essential to establish an autonomous forum where the 23 participants can deal with security issues on their own merits. And, importantly, the CFE negotiation, unlike other negotiations within the framework of the CSCE process, will pursue agreements that are legally binding. In other words, we'll be working toward a treaty or, if we're fortunate, a series of treaties.

We and our allies plan to table proposals in the new talks that would limit the total holdings of those armaments most relevant to offensive action, that is to the seizing and holding of territory, and to seek substantially lower levels with parity in those forces between the two alliances.

Our proposals would also limit the holdings of such armaments by any one country and set a fixed percentage of the total holdings of the two sides in Europe.

Our proposals would place ceilings on such armaments in Europe held by forces stationed outside the borders of their own country.

And our proposals would provide effective and rigorous verification, including exchange of detailed information on military forces and mandatory inspection.

In combination, we believe that these measures would have a direct impact on the massive forward deployments of offensively-oriented Soviet armored forces that have been stationed in Eastern Europe for a generation and which make Central Europe the site of the heaviest concentration of military force in the world.

Agreement on a complementary regime of militarily significant limitations and stability enhancing measures, and their successful, verified implementation, would result in a far-reaching improvement in European security. Such measures could also help reinforce positive trends toward a freer and more humane community of nations in Europe.

We're encouraged by the new tone in statements coming out of Moscow, and we're prepared for serious, intensive negotiations. But we must be sure that all the measures we agree will result in beneficial and enduring changes. The negotiation we are about to embark upon offers us a forum for exploring ideas, probing intentions and finally for committing the participants to binding, verifiable obligations.

It will no doubt be a difficult and complex process, but the time is right for a new beginning and the goal is one of the most important in the whole spectrum of arms control today.

Thank you.

Chairman DeConcini. Thank you, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar follows:]

Opening Statement

by

Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar,

United States Representative to the

European Conventional Arms Negotiations

THE NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

February 23, 1989

for

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Chairman: Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona)

(Please check against delivery)

THE NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

Mr. Chairman:

It is a pleasure to appear before this group at a promising juncture for conventional arms control. The conclusion last month of a mandate for a new Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) has set the stage for the NATO allies to test Soviet willingness to lower the level of East-West military confrontation and enhance security and stability through a binding arms control agreement covering Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

As you know, agreement to the mandate by the 23 States which will participate in the new talks -- the NATO allies and the Warsaw Pact countries -- was a key element in the conclusion of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. In this regard, I recall the concern of many veterans of the CSCE process that negotiations on the mandate might tip the CSCE balance unacceptably toward security issues at the expense of human rights. We did not allow this to happen. The human rights sections of the Vienna Document contain unprecedented achievements. Indeed, the East's interest in clearing the way for new conventional talks was an important part of the West's leverage for getting commitments which met our own CSCE agenda.

With the Vienna meeting behind us and the 23 participants preparing for the opening of the CFE talks on March 9, this is a logical time to look again at the relationship between conventional arms negotiations and the CSCE. The CFE Talks will be an autonomous negotiation conducted within the framework of the CSCE process. This relationship reflects the reality that it is the armed forces of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance and of the parties to the Warsaw Pact that bear most immediately on the essential security relationship in Europe. At the same time, it is not just the members of the two European military alliances, but all 35 CSCE participating states, that have an interest in the issues we will be discussing.

The 23 countries participating in the CFE Talks will determine their own agenda, pace, and objectives, and will be solely responsible for determining the outcome of the negotiation. Representatives to the CFE negotiation will, however, meet regularly with the 12 European neutral and non-aligned states for an update on CFE's progress. The 23 have pledged to take the views of other CSCE states concerning their own security into consideration in the CFE negotiation. The next CSCE Follow-up Meeting, in Helsinki in 1992, will provide an opportunity to exchange views on progress in CFE.

These arrangements, which all 35 CSCE states have agreed on, ensure that the members of the two alliances can negotiate confidentially, out of the limelight, and without pressure from other issues or artificial deadlines. Given that the negotiations will be dealing with core aspects of our national defenses, it is essential to establish an autonomous forum where the 23 participants can deal with security issues on their own merits. And, importantly, the CFE negotiation, unlike other negotiations within the framework of this CSCE process, will pursue agreements that are legally binding.

We and our allies plan to table proposals in the new talks that would:

-- Limit total holdings of those armaments most relevant to offensive action -- the seizing and holding of territory -- at substantially lower levels, with parity in these forces between the two alliances;

-- Limit the holdings of such armaments by any one country, set at a fixed percentage of the total holdings of the two sides in Europe;

-- Place ceilings on such armaments in Europe held by forces stationed outside the borders of their own country; and

-- Provide effective and rigorous verification, including exchange of detailed information on military forces and mandatory inspection.

In combination, these measures would have a direct impact on the massive forward deployments of offensively-oriented Soviet armored forces that have been stationed in Eastern Europe for a generation, and which make central Europe the site of the heaviest concentration of military force in the world.

Agreement on a complementary regime of militarily significant limitations and stability-enhancing measures, and their successful, verified implementation, would result in a far-reaching improvement in European security. Such measures could also help reinforce positive trends toward a freer and more humane community of nations in Europe.

We are encouraged by the new tone in statements coming out of Moscow, and we are prepared for serious, intensive negotiations. But we must be sure that all the measures we agree to will result in beneficial and enduring changes. The negotiation we are about to embark upon offers us a forum for exploring ideas, probing intentions, and finally, for committing the participants to binding, verifiable obligations. It will no doubt be a difficult and complex process, but the time is right for a new beginning, and the goal is one of the most important in the whole spectrum of arms control today. Thank you.

Chairman DeConcini. I want at this time to recognize Richard Schifter from the State Department, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, who is here with us.

Mr. Schifter, if you'd like to join us, we'd be more than happy to have you come up here.

He's been a very active member. He was in the Soviet Union with us and we thank him for his outstanding contributions. He's a Commissioner, Mr. Ambassador. He gets to sit up here and ask you all questions. I'm sure you're anxious to do that to your colleagues.

I'll now yield to Congressman Smith, a very active member of the Commission. We welcome him here today for any remarks he may have.

Representative Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to put my full statement into the record.

Chairman DeConcini. Without objection.

Representative Smith. I welcome our distinguished Ambassadors to this hearing and look forward to the questioning. I missed most of your comments, having participated at a press conference that went over its time limit. I apologize for that. Thank you for being here today.

[Prepared statement of Representative Christopher H. Smith follows:]

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
FOURTH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
FEBRUARY 23, 1989

Mr. Chairman, I want to express my thanks to Ambassador Zimmerman for his tireless and diligent negotiations in Vienna over the last two years. I believe the Vienna Concluding Document is a strong document which will further enhance the "Helsinki process" which is our means for promoting human rights world-wide. As a Sommissioner on the Helsinki Commission, I look forward to working within the context of the Vienna Concluding Document to foster human rights.

In November, Mr. Chairman, for the first time, the Soviets agreed to meet formally with the (Helsinki) Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The meetings with high-ranking Soviet officials from the Supreme Soviet and from a number of Ministries, members of the Soviet Human Rights Commission and, most importantly, leading Soviet dissidents proved to be very productive from my point of view. Having Soviet government authorities agree to meet with these religious and political dissidents was unprecedented and will hopefully mark the beginning of a new life for the undaunted dissidents and their families.

While the discussions were substantive, frank, and candid, the Soviets have only begun to take the initial steps expected of civilized nations which uphold and revere human rights. The key to further negotiations and mutual respect will continue to be the human rights performance by the Soviets. Only when a government is willing to protect personal freedoms and allow true freedom of conscience is it worthy of trust in treaties and other arms control measures.

During the Moscow meetings I was an active participant within the working group on religion. I focused much of my discussion with our Soviet counterparts on the need for the believers to have Bibles and other religious literature, and especially the freedom to teach youngsters the tenets of their faith and participate in charitable activites. The Soviets did promise that new religious laws were forthcoming and such activities would be permitted.

The Vienna Concluding Document is carefully worded in Principle 16 to "ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and practice religion or belief." In particular, the Document outlines several key provisions under this Principle. For example, "...the participating States will... respect the right of religious communities to... establish and maintain freely accessible places of worship or assembly... respect the right of everyone to give and receive religious education in the language of his choice... [respect] the liberty of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions... allow religious faiths, institutions and organizations to produce and import and disseminate religoius publications and materials." Mr. Chairman, these are issues which we have been calling for for years and I am hopeful that such specific commitments will be met by the signatory nations. Furthermore, I believe the document will strengthen our hand when negotiating with the Soviet Union and others in the East bloc.

Mr. Chairman, I was quite disturbed to read the comments made by the Romanian delegation immediately after signing the document. Their stated intentions to ignore certain portions of the Vienna Concluding Document fly in the face of the civilized world. Such blatant defiance must not go unnoticed.

Earlier this week, during a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing with Secretary of State James Baker, I asked the Secretary what obligation the U.S. and other countries had to pariticipate in -- or even permit -- the scheduled Human Rights Conference in Moscow in 1992. I was glad to hear the Secretary's response -- the Conference in Moscow was conditional on their adherence to the Concluding Document in the intervening years. Mr. Chairman, rest assured that many of us will be closely watching.

Chairman DeConcini. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. Secretary, do you have any statements you care to make at this time?

Ambassador Schifter. No.

Chairman DeConcini. Thank you for being with us.

Ambassador Zimmermann, let me ask the first question. You undoubtedly experienced a great deal of pressure during the Vienna Meeting. I was only there once, but Chairman Hoyer was there a number of times and he often said he could tell you were under a great deal of pressure. Not only didn't you have any money to pay your bills for awhile, but there were all kinds of pulls and tugs to end the meeting and to accommodate different people from the Commission and from allies and from the administration to some extent.

Let me ask you this question. What do you feel would have happened if the United States had held firm for, say, a few more weeks or a month or two regarding the release of some long-term refuseniks before we agreed to the Moscow Conference?

Ambassador Zimmermann. Well, it's a question, Mr. Chairman, which of course, we asked ourselves many times: when we should decide to end or whether we should go on. My own judgment, which I communicated to Washington, was that our leverage was really at its highest in the period of December, January. That was partly because of the perception by our allies and the Soviet Union of the end of an administration.

It was also because the Austrian Government had invited all the foreign ministers to come on the 17th, 18th and 19th of January. Of course, that was not a committing deadline and we didn't treat it as such.

But my own view was the Soviet Union would not necessarily give us more if we had waited longer. My guess is it might well have given us less as it began to lose patience with the nonachievement of its two major objectives at the Vienna Meeting, that is the beginning of the arms control talks and the Moscow Conference. It was a judgment call. We made it. I believe very strongly that it was the right call.

Chairman DeConcini. Well, it certainly appears to not have been a bad call, though I thought it was worth waiting for. I yield to your judgment and certainly your experience.

Could or should the U.S. reverse its decision to go to Moscow if the Soviet's performance regresses, would we be in violation of the Vienna Concluding Document if we took such action?

Ambassador Zimmermann. No, I don't think so. There's never been, in my memory, a boycott of a CSCE meeting. But CSCE is constantly creating new precedents. So, I don't think there is any rule against it. We've made it very clear that the assurances that were provided by Mr. Gorbachev in his U.N. speech would have to be honored and if they weren't honored, we would be prepared to review our position about the Moscow Conference. That is also the position of at least one of our allies, the United Kingdom.

Chairman DeConcini. Thank you.

Ambassador Ledogar, there was a considerable shift, it appeared, in the U.S. position on the question of autonomy between the CDE and the CFE talks. For example, we had sought to have the talks held in separate cities. Now they're being held in the same building complex. What are the causes of these shifts?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Primarily, Mr. Chairman, the causes of the shifts were the need to approach, on the basis of alliance consensus, the question of the design of the new negotiation, and the question of the relationship of the new negotiation to the CSCE process.

Washington at times had a certain difficulty getting itself pulled together on this issue. There were, quite frankly, two views about what would be the best relationship. There was no doubt that some of our European allies, most particularly France, favored an arrangement whereby the new Force Level talks would be, if not wholly within the CSCE process, then at least so close that one could not tell the difference.

When we began to coalesce in Washington, the U.S. came down from a point of view that we should have some relationship to the CSCE process, but the differences from CSCE were to be more important than the similarities. Even as we began the negotiation of the mandate, we continued this debate within the alliance and came upon a compromise only in June of 1987 at a NATO ministerial in Reykjavik, the compromise which the allies held to and defended and indeed imposed upon all of the others.

That is, in our view the way to do it—the optimal way respecting all the points of view—was to have a conventional force level negotiation that would be within the framework of the CSCE process, but autonomous in certain key respects. Particularly we listed (a) autonomy as to participation, 23 not 35; (b) autonomy as to procedures, we make our own procedures. It's a confidential forum. It's quite different in the way it will proceed from a typical CSCE meeting; and (c) autonomy as to certain other key modalities.

Chairman DECONCINI. Is that going to be, in your judgment, positive for our side or is that going to have to wait to be determined?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. I think——

Chairman DECONCINI. Are we better off under this arrangement?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Well, I think we're better off than the former arrangement, which was the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks. There are a variety of reasons for that judgment, only part is this organizational one. I think we're better off particularly in that the 16 of us on our side are going into this with a unified approach, a unified position. We never had all 16 allies in MBFR.

I think we're better off in that we've designed ourselves a forum which includes the entire continent of Europe, not the small central zone which was the concentration of MBFR—a concentration which many of us believe was almost a design fault 15 years ago. (But that's a separate discussion maybe we don't want to spend too much time on.)

I think that we're also better off in that in the long run we have a relationship now with the CSCE process that will keep the 12 neutral and non-aligned nations informed and engaged. And yet at the same time we have the virtues of being able to do the business at 23 without outside interference and of having the essential elements of, from our point of view, alliance cohesion and solidarity, so that we approach this with one voice.

The problem we confront, essentially is an "our side/your side" problem. The concepts of symmetry or asymmetry, parity or disparity, balance or imbalance are two-sided concepts. We mean when we say those things the Eastern side and the Western side. So, the essence of the negotiation is an our side/your side thing, and yet we are able with this loose association of 23 and their relationship of CSCE also to achieve the benefits of that process.

Chairman DeConcini. Thank you.

Chairman Hoyer?

Cochairman Hoyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The premises on which we considered the Moscow Conference, Mr. Ambassador, as you've already articulated them, one of which was the resolution of cases. Would you expand upon your understanding of the 6- month requirement of the bilateral human contacts cases resolution and what mechanism is going to be pursued? Presumably we'll discuss that in Paris, but if you could amplify on that, I'd appreciate it.

Ambassador Zimmermann. Yes, I certainly will try to, Mr. Chairman. There is a passage in the document which talks about the resolution of all cases within 6 months. There's another part of the document which provides a mechanism for bilateral discussion of cases. Any country can raise any case with any other country at any time.

On the first issue, we would hope and we will do all we can to achieve a resolution in a positive vein of all cases within 6 months of the close of Vienna. And as an effort to help create pressure in this direction, we are going to make very liberal use of the mechanism that's provided for. We've already done so in several cases with Eastern countries of raising cases by the Vienna Document and a number of our allies have done the same thing. To the extent that cases are not settled by the time of the Paris Meeting, which begins in late May, I think you can expect a concerted NATO effort to bring these cases to public attention and to try to get them resolved.

Cochairman Hoyer. One of the things that we discussed was the resolution of political prisoner cases which includes the psychiatric, allegedly noncriminal but psychiatric incarceration, if you will. Secretary Schifter and I have discussed, as recently as today, the mechanisms for pursuing those.

Did you have discussions with Ambassador Kashlev with respect to those mechanisms at all, particularly with respect to political prisoners?

Ambassador Zimmermann. I did only in a very general sense because the main effort was carried on by Secretary Schifter in his tireless work with Soviet officials in Moscow and in Washington and in other places to try to get that list trimmed down. I was assigned to deal with it as an element of the negotiations. The details were in the provence of Secretary Schifter.

Cochairman Hoyer. On another subject, and I want to——

Representative Ritter. If the gentleman would yield just for a moment——

Cochairman Hoyer. Yield.

Representative Ritter. I would like to bring up one specific case. While the American Psychiatric Association was visiting, the Soviets took Mr. Anatoly Ilchenko, a Ukrainian, and incarcerated him in a psychiatric prison for seeking to collect petitions on the issue of nuclear power in that part of the Soviet Union. He's been in since December 21. This flew right in the face of the change that supposedly was taking place. When we went to Moscow, we were guaranteed there would be no more psychiatric incarcerations. And yet on December 21 there was a significant psychiatric incarceration for political purposes.

Could you comment on that?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Yes. Well, of course, there are more cases than that one. That's a serious case.

Representative RITTER. Of recent incarcerations?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. No. I'm talking about those whom we feel are in psychiatric institutions for political reasons. It's our strong hope that this group of psychiatrists, which will be traveling to the Soviet Union I think this weekend, will be able to get a firsthand impression through interviews with these people of whether we are right in saying that they're political prisoners or whether the Soviets are right in saying that they're not.

Representative RITTER. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Cochairman HOYER. I think I understand what you're saying in terms of Secretary Schifter's primary responsibility for the negotiations with reference to mechanisms to pursue the identification and verification of political prisoners: as to whether in fact, they are criminals or whether, as we believe in most instances, they were incarcerated not for criminal reasons but for political reasons.

If you had discussions with Ambassador Kashlev, and maybe you didn't, but if you had discussions, did he make any representations with respect to assurances by his government that they were going to pursue the political prisoners issue in a manner which would assure us of the validity of those convictions and their nonpolitical nature?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, on the two issues that were raised regarding psychiatric prisoners in psychiatric institutions and prisoners who we felt were the subject of trumped up charges, he simply reflected the kinds of things that Soviet officials were telling our Embassy and were telling Secretary Schifter and were telling Secretary of State Shultz. In other words, he had no independent mandate to discuss these things in terms other than had already been laid out by his superiors.

Cochairman HOYER. Let me go on to another subject briefly. There was a report, and Senator DeConcini in his question to you reflected a little bit of that, where Secretary Baker has indicated that in effect our agreement to Moscow was conditional.

It is my understanding of our position, and I want to have you clarify it if you can, that with respect to Moscow, in effect, we have agreed to go to Moscow, not conditionally but that conditions could change which would have an effect on our actually going to Moscow. In other words, what I'm trying to get at, am I correct it's not the United States' position that any signatory state could conditionally approve—the Romanians tried to say that some of these undertakings they were not going to adhere to. That was correctly disputed and rejected by I think everybody.

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. The commitment that was made in the document was that there would be a Moscow meeting on human rights in 1991. The presumption is that the United States will go to it. But we made an explicit condition, as did the British, with regard to the requirement of assurances which had to be carried through. We said if they were not carried through we would review our decision to go to Moscow.

The analogy, if you will, could be made with the fact that in 1976 we agreed to go the Olympic Games in Moscow. In 1980, because of the invasion of Afghanistan, we did not go to the Olympic Games. I don't think anybody could accuse us in that instance of a breach of faith.

Cochairman **Hoyer**. Ambassador Ledogar, let me say as one of those who was a principal proponent of the autonomy of what we were then calling the CST talks, later called the CAFE talks and now called CFE, I'm not sure that there is autonomy at this point in time. Am I correct that it appears that the United States will be the only delegation that is presently planning to have two delegations to the CFE and the CSBM talks? Are there any other delegations that plan to have two?

Ambassador **Ledogar**. According to my information, the Federal Republic of Germany certainly will have two distinct delegations, as we plan to. The Soviet Union may also have two distinct delegations; although if they do, it appears as though one of their two ambassadors will have an overall responsibility for the other.

Cochairman **Hoyer**. A practical question. What will be the cost to us of the two delegations? Do you know that? Can you hypothesize that?

Ambassador **Ledogar**. It would be difficult to give you a meaningful figure, Mr. Chairman, because on the one hand there is the basic in-house costs for our own expenses and housekeeping and so forth. There is the much larger cost of reimbursing the Austrian Government for the services that it, as host country, provides: the facilities, the translation, the interpretation and certain other arrangements. I think security, some of it, the internal security, is also in there.

Without getting into exact figures, those costs that we will incur along with all the others, according to the cost sharing formula, among, on the one hand, the 23 participants and, on the other hand, among the 35, there would be no change at all by having our delegations joined in whole or in part.

It is a separate question of whether or not there would, for the executive branch, be certain economies by having some diplomats and other representatives dual-hatted.

Incidently I think my budget for the MBFR delegation was approximately $2 million for a year. That included the reimbursement to the Austrian Government for conference services.

But if there were economies, they would be very, very minor, as I would foresee them, in comparison to the political importance to us of having true autonomy and distinction in our approaches to the two negotiations.

Now let me, if I may, just give you a couple of examples of this. We started from the very beginning with the belief that we needed autonomy so that we could do these important security negotiations on their own merits once the talks started. We believed we did not require, indeed we would not have forced upon us, the intermediary role, the good offices of nonparticipants—those who did not want to have their troops, nor their armed forces, nor their territory at issue.

We felt very strongly that on important security questions one should not march to a calendar other than that which recommends itself and that you agree upon. So, we don't want to have to come to suspensions or deadlines which are written into the CSCE calendar—ones that may not necessarily recommend themselves in force level talks.

And importantly, as I suggested in my prepared statement, we need, according to U.S. law, a forum where we will pursue treaty agreements, not the political kinds of agreements that are typical of the CSCE process.

Now, all of those elements we have carefully designed in. I'm suggesting that while we'll certainly look at the subject that your question raises, the economies that might be achieved by dual—hatting certain individuals and so forth, it's very important to us that we maintain this essential autonomy, this distinction between the two approaches, one at 23 and the other at 35.

Cochairman **Hoyer**. Mr. Ambassador, the last question, and we've been thinking a lot about this since our discussions. Our discussions, of course, were premised on the fact, as you know, that initially we thought that these would be in different cities. Then we thought they would be in different buildings. They have ended up in different rooms. All but perhaps the three delegations that you've mentioned will be dual delegations.

It occurs to me that all but the U.S. delegations and maybe the West Germans and the Soviets, although you indicate it may be headed by one with overall responsibility, will be participants in both the CSBM talks and the CFE talks. Might that not disadvantage the U.S. delegation in light of the fact, as a practical matter, the delegations are going to be across the hall from one another essentially? There will be at least five or six, as I understand it, consultations during the period of a session. Might not the U.S. delegation be disadvantaged by not participating in both and not being able to attend to both talks?

Ambassador **Ledogar**. Different cities would have been ideal in terms of enforcing autonomy. We found that there was not much support from that, especially from the smaller countries. We did not, however, as you say, move to just different rooms.

If I may, we're going to use totally different sides of what is the same Hofburg complex, with separate entrances, sealed off areas. Any diplomat there will have to use one pass to get into the 23 spaces and another pass to get into the 35 spaces. No diplomat who is not a participant in CFE will be anywhere near the area where we either do the actual CFE negotiation or where we have corridor conversations and a cup of coffee in between.

We have taken a number of steps in insure that the communication with the 12 nonparticipants will be very carefully designed, will occur in certain specified periods, approximately 4 weeks apart, and will contain an exchange of information agreed upon in advance by the participants. So, it is not quite as likely to merge together as some people tend to think.

On the question of coordination, I can only express the view, and I trust that my colleague, Ambassador Zimmermann agrees, that it worked well. We had two totally separate negotiating teams there, and yet everything that I was doing in the mandate was reflected in part in one of the sections that he and Ambassador Frowick were working on.

It required the utmost coordination so that we didn't get ourselves leveraged by folks who were, in some cases, in both of these, and by the neutrals who were not neutral about the 23/35 relationship. They were advocates about the relationship and the information exchange. I think that Warren and I did a pretty good job of staying very well coordinated and I would look forward to that same kind of success with my colleague on the CSBM negotiation.

Cochairman **Hoyer**. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I want to pursue that further, but my time is way over. My colleagues agree.

Chairman **DeConcini**. Congressman Feighan?

Representative **Feighan**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Zimmermann, I'd like to followup on my colleague, Congressman Hoyer's questions about the Moscow Meeting for just a few moments, if I can. The decision has been greeted with continuing controversy in this country. What has been the reaction of prominent Soviet dissidents to the agreement for the Human Dimensions Conference in the Soviet Union?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. They have always had mixed views about a Moscow conference and as far as I know they still have mixed views. Some think it was a good idea for us to agree to it, some think that we shouldn't have. Our own position, of course, was based to some extent on the views of a number of dissidents in the Soviet Union, particularly the views of Andrei Sakharov, who set out some conditions early on which the Soviets effectively met.

Representative **Feighan**. Let me ask you about the scope of that conference. I'm concerned about Shevardnadze's comments of 2 years ago that describe the scope in terms of human contacts, information, culture, education, essentially all Basket III issues, and avoiding any Basket I human rights, fundamental freedom issues.

What do you understand to be the scope of that session and how might the scope of the session be changed between now and 1991?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. The mandate for the Moscow Conference has already been written. It's the same as the mandate for the Paris and the Copenhagen Conference. All three of these human rights meetings are grouped under the rubric of Conference on the Human Dimension.

One of the hardest issues we had to fight in Vienna was to narrow the focus down to human rights and human contacts and we did it. The Moscow Conference will have to deal with human rights and human contacts. It doesn't mean that the Soviets can't drag in other issues. It's been a highly prized rule, highly prized by us in the CSCE, that you can raise any issue you want to. But the mandate restricts the focus to human rights and human contacts.

Representative **Feighan**. Let me ask you, Ambassador, with regard to the Romanian Government's posture on the final document. I think Senator McClure described very graphically the dramatic response by the member delegations which I think would have accurately reflected the response of virtually anyone in this audience or in this country who had been participating.

Share with us first whether or not the United States had a formal response to that statement at the occasion and, second, what your concerns might be with respect to the precedent-setting nature of their position as the conference concluded in Vienna.

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Yes, we did have a response to what the Romanians did. Canada spoke for us at the meetings, spoke for the NATO countries in rejecting the attempt by the Romanians to selectively adhere to or not adhere to the document. Right after the meeting at which that took place ended, I went upstairs and gave a press conference in which I said on the record that the Romanian action was illegal and absurd. I really think that describes it quite accurately.

I don't think it sets a precedent. The Romanians have no leg to stand on. You can't selectively interpret a final document. Documents in the CSCE are all based on tradeoffs. The compromises are all in the document. You can't just pick out a plum or an apple that you don't like and throw it away. The Romanians can say that, but nobody is going to take them seriously. If they violate as they continue to do, if they continue to violate any part of that document, they're going to be called to account for it, not only by the United States but by our allies, I expect by a large number of neutral and non-aligned countries, and undoubtedly by at least one or two of their allies. So, I'm not so worried about that Romanian statement. The Romanians are subject to their commitments.

Representative FEIGHAN. I'm encouraged by that view. Was a Soviet reaction, either formally or informally expressed?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Informally the Soviets let it be known that they considered the Romanians were subject to the commitments because, of course, the Soviets have a vested interest in having the West subject to some commitments in the document. The Soviets are not particularly interested, in my view, in selective adherence either.

Representative FEIGHAN. National minorities in Romania, particularly Hungarians, and others, for that matter, Turkish minorities in Bulgaria, are suffering continued denial of human rights. What impact does the final document have on the actions of those two regimes towards their national minorities? What leverage remains in the CSCE process to deal with that issue?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, most of the leverage in CSCE is public leverage, is standing countries which violate up against a wall of criticism by countries in the West, by neutral countries, even by some of the Eastern countries. Nobody criticized the Romanians harder than the Hungarians at the Vienna Meeting.

The document per se does not change implementation, does not improve Bulgarian treatment of Turks, does not improve Romanian treatment of Hungarians. But it provides a higher standard for the rest of us to call the Romanians and Bulgarians to account. There's very strong language in the document on the rights of minorities. We will use that language, we're already doing it with the Bulgarians and we have with the Romanians, to put continued pressure on them. And of course there will be this series of meetings coming up on human rights where this kind of public censure can be used.

Representative FEIGHAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DECONCINI. Congressman Ritter?

Representative RITTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to read the statement of Secretary of State Baker at the Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on Tuesday. He said that our attending the Moscow Conference was conditional, among other things, on the ending of jamming, on the removal of certain obstacles that are still in place as far as emigration is concerned, on the abolition of key parts of the Soviet Criminal Code, and on the passage of legislation respecting press freedoms.

It seems to me that he is laying down some fairly firm conditions, with which I agree. It seems to me that, for example, the revocation of the state secret characterization, which is used to impede the natural flow of emigration, might be one of these conditions, or at least up to a certain point it might be one of these conditions. Is that true?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Certainly. The abuse of state secrets is, I think, the most important abuse in the whole emigration field.

Representative RITTER. Is this abuse sufficient enough the hold us back from going to the Moscow Conference? I mean if it doesn't change at all and they continue to abuse this state secret characterization, is this sufficient to keep us from going to Moscow?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, I can't predict what decision will be made by the U.S. Government in 1991. But as Secretary Baker said and Secretary Shultz said before him, those are categories in which reforms must continue and increase. If they don't, then there is going to be a review of our participation in the Moscow Conference.

Representative RITTER. I call to mind, just for the record, Igor and Ina Uspenski. They have now spent 8 years or 9 years in refusal. Ostensibly the reason is state secrets. If you talk to these people, there doesn't seem to have been any possession of state secrets. But there are many like them. It's not just those, but many like them. I think we have to continue to stand up firmly for those people abused by the characterization of state secrets.

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. I absolutely agree with you, Congressman.

Representative RITTER. I also am concerned about the demonstration law. The demonstration law that went into effect in July actually curtails the ability of Soviet citizens to demonstrate because it puts the permission process in the hands of local party officials. If they want to have a demonstration, they can allow it. If they don't want it, they don't have to allow it.

Now, this is, I guess, legal. It's part of the new legal system that the Soviets are evolving. But this, to me, is in direct violation of everything that the Helsinki process stands for.

Are we making attempts to seek the repeal of the demonstration law?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Yes, we are and we made a large focus on the demonstration law during the Vienna Meeting, just as we made a large focus on the emigration law, which was also retrograde, passed in January 1987.

Representative RITTER. It would seem to me that the demonstration law and the handing down of administrative sentences are unacceptable. Stepan Khmara, a Ukrainian activist who we met with while we were there, has received two of these, for a total of 30 days incarceration, none of which has even gone before a court. It's simply an administrative sentence of 15 days. It seems to me this is the kind of condition that cannot possibly exist while we are headed towards a Moscow human rights conference. This could be, in fact, engaged while we were there, to hold back free expression.

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. I think all——

Representative RITTER. Is this grounds for conditions to——

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. I can't predict what specific issues we will look at when the time comes, but I can say this, that these are all elements of Soviet human rights violations which we expect to be cleared up by the time of the Moscow Conference. Our view of the Moscow Conference was, when we decided that we would agree to it, we based our agreement on implementation that had been achieved, largely with regard to political prisoners, jamming and emigration. Also on the assurances which you've correctly quoted. But also we felt that as far as leverage was concerned we would have more leverage if a Moscow conference was impending 2 years out than if there was nothing impending for the Soviets to have to worry about their reputation on.

Representative RITTER. I would like to add one last comment. The Vienna agreement gives any signatory the right to ask for bilateral meetings if we suspect that another country is violating the rules. But I mentioned the psychiatric incarceration of Ilchenko; I mentioned Stepan Khmara, two 15-day administrative terms; Ivan Makar, who was freed for our presence when we were in Moscow. He has seen, just recently, a 15-day administrative law sentence.

Right now, I would like to engage a bilateral contact on the basis of these violations. I think that the Uspenskis still being withheld from emigration and the other long-term refuseniks being denied on state secret grounds are grounds for a bilateral meeting on violations of the terms of the agreement.

What's the threshold? What's going to constitute a violation?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, the threshold can be one case. In fact, we have bilateral meetings with the Soviets in Moscow and to some extent in Washington on a weekly and sometimes almost on a daily basis. That has been an achievement which I largely credit Assistant Secretary Schifter for getting. Not only do we have regularly scheduled human rights meetings periodically with the Soviet Union, but we have routinely gone in to protest the kinds of violations which you are concerned about as well.

Representative RITTER. And we make these public?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Often we make them public. We do it in a way which, in our judgment, is best designed to get a result. If a private meeting is a better way to get a result, we would keep it private. If making publicity about it is better, then we would do it that way.

The mechanism that you refer to, which is, I think, one of the most valuable aspects of the whole document, is in a way less important for the United States which has very highly developed channels of communication with the Soviet Union on these issues, as do some of our larger allies like the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. I think this mechanism will be most useful to the smaller NATO countries, most of whom are very strong on human rights, but have not had access to the foreign ministries and to decisionmakers in the Soviet Union and some of the other Eastern countries. This will give them that access.

Representative RITTER. Just one final comment. Some of us have written letters to our colleagues in the Soviet Union who were our counterparts during the Moscow Meeting in November. How good can glasnost be if we can't even get a response from these? What should be our approach to try to come up with some responsiveness on the part of people who we broke a lot of bread with and had a lot of unprecedented conversation with, when we write a letter on what we think is something important and the response is like ice.

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. You touch on a very important area. There is a paragraph in our final document calling for rapid and unhindered delivery of mail. That, of course, has been one of the major abuses by the Soviet Union and some of its allies that they just never deliver the mail. I expect that could be what's happening to your letters.

Representative RITTER. If there's anybody here from the Soviet Embassy and wants copies of my letters and could expedite their delivery, I would be delighted to meet you after the meeting.

Cochairman HOYER. Will the gentleman yield?

Representative RITTER. I will yield, "Yes."

Cochairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador, I don't think that's the case. I think Congressman Ritter's letters have been received. They are sent to members of the Supreme Soviet and I presume that they are delivering mail to members of the Supreme Soviet even from such a nefarious source as Congressman Ritter.

What we have attempted to do and what we need to continue to do is to demand of one another that we respond in timely fashions. There is, of course, a requirement in the Vienna Document that that happen.

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Yes.

Cochairman HOYER. But, Ambassador Ledogar, when we deal with the Soviets in particular, but others as well, we really ought to press for prompt response to inquiries certainly by Members of Congress because one of the frustrations is when public advocates, NGOs try to correspond and get no response, it is very frustrating. I think the delivery is a different question.

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. I'm sorry, I misunderstood. I thought he was writing to refuseniks and dissidents.

Cochairman HOYER. No, no. He was just talking about government.

Representative RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DECONCINI. Are you finished?

Cochairman HOYER. Yes.

Chairman DECONCINI. Chairman Fascell?

Representative FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, this mechanism for bilateral discussions under the Concluding Document, what's the difference between that and bilateral any time?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. There's no difference except many countries have not been able to get bilateral discussions, Mr. Chairman.

Representative **Fascell**. It takes two to be bilateral.

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. That's right. And now, if these discussions are turned down by the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, it's a violation and we can at least make some trouble over it.

Representative **Fascell**. So, the big difference is that the document makes it a violation to refuse the bilateral when it's requested pursuant to the terms of the Concluding Document.

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. That's correct

Representative **Fascell**. So that's a new mechanism?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. That's right.

Representative **Fascell**. I know where everybody wound up with respect to CFE, but tell me where the Soviets started from on the autonomy of CFE?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. Well, I'll defer to Ambassador Ledogar for some of that question, but let me just say that the Soviets had no interest in autonomy at the beginning and very little interest at the end. They agreed to it unwillingly. They wanted to merge the talks because in my view they wanted to——

Representative **Fascell**. Excuse me for interrupting you. They wanted to merge the talks. Do you mean by that that the Soviets started out with the idea that the conventional armed force talks should be totally within the framework of CSCE?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. They wanted them to be CSCE meetings.

Representative **Fascell**. Yes. So they——

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. Fully within the framework of CSCE.

Representative **Fascell**. So that could be interpreted as their drive for the all European Conference.

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. I think so.

Representative **Fascell**. And that it could be interpreted as saying that the conventional armed force talks would be wrapped up into the CFE talks under the CSCE.

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. That's right.

Representative **Fascell**. Is that right?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. That's correct.

Representative **Fascell**. That's where they started out?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. That was their position from beginning to end.

Representative **Fascell**. All right. Was that the same as the French position?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. The French position was changed under a good deal of——

Representative **Fascell**. When the French started out and made the first initiative with respect to the CDE.

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. The French wanted a merger of the talks because they did not want any talks in any framework that looked like MBFR. They did not want alliance-to-alliance talks, and that's of course what we did want.

Representative **Fascell.** That's because they weren't in them.

Ambassador **Zimmermann.** They would not have wanted them even if they had been invited to be in them.

Representative **Fascell.** So they held out for an all European type of conference regardless of what the format ultimately was?

Ambassador **Zimmermann.** That was their position, but they changed it in the compromise that Ambassador Ledogar referred to.

Representative **Fascell.** No, I understand that.

Ambassador **Zimmermann.** But that was their position, that's correct.

Representative **Fascell.** Obviously everybody voted for the compromise since it has to be unanimous in order to get it through.

Ambassador **Zimmermann.** Right.

Ambassador **Ledogar.** May I add something to that answer, please?

Representative **Fascell.** Yes, please do.

Ambassador **Ledogar.** First of all, I agree with what Ambassador Zimmermann said. Second of all, I think it's important to recognize, however, that some of the Soviet support for a full-fledged CSCE approach was rather cynically motivated by trying to appear as the heroes of the 12 neutral non-aligned. I found in the actual negotiation of the mandate, that when we pushed hard on autonomy and the various aspects that we insisted be written into the mandate, that we found the Soviets were much more interested in a prompt agreement than they were in continuing this pretense, that they were quite willing to accede to the essential elements of autonomy, namely that there be 23 and 23 only.

Representative **Fascell.** So the big accomplishment, basically, was that the French voice was heard.

Ambassador **Ledogar.** I think the U.S. voice was heard also.

Representative **Fascell.** Well, no, I don't mean that in a disparaging way. I mean they got included. Up until then they were out.

Ambassador **Ledogar.** That was a very big accomplishment and is one of the major differences in this new forum and one of the major reasons, in my judgment, for a measured degree of optimism.

Representative **Fascell.** I understand.

Ambassador **Ledogar.** Because the absence of France and of Spain and of others from the Mutual Balance Force Reduction Talks and their absolute refusal to allow us to effectively take their forces into consideration was an obstacle in MBFR.

Representative **Fascell.** I understand. Now, the format which was finally agreed upon hopefully overcomes those objections. In other words, the 23 have a measure of autonomy to negotiate and to reach an agreement. Is that correct?

Ambassador **Ledogar.** That's correct. That's what we believe.

Representative **Fascell.** In the meantime, the format allows the 35 to be fully informed and included in and excluded at the same time. Now, does the 35 have a veto?

Ambassador **Ledogar.** The 35 has no veto. The outcome will be determined solely by the 23.

Representative **Fascell.** So, the rules of procedure with respect to the 23 are not the same as they are for the 35.

Ambassador **Ledogar**. In many significant respects they are significantly different.

Representative **Fascell**. And one of the differences is that under the 35 you have to have unanimous consent of the 35. The question therefore is, is that the same rule with regard to the 23?

Ambassador **Ledogar**. We will work by consensus at the 23. We will work, however, only at 23 and when the 23 have reached a conclusion, that is the conclusion. It will be informed, discussed with the 12 others, but they will have no right of a veto, no right to modify. They will be given the opportunity in the course of the negotiation to make a certain amount of input. Whether that input is indeed reflected in the outcome or not is a matter for the 23 to determine.

Representative **Fascell**. I have one more question, Mr. Chairman, just to pursue this line of reasoning.

Cochairman **Hoyer**. Go ahead.

Representative **Fascell**. That is that in the normal Helsinki process you have the conclusion of a meeting and the establishment of another meeting by virtue of the agreement of the 35. That is not possible under the procedures which have been agreed to for the 23. Is that correct?

Ambassador **Ledogar**. That's correct. We will set our own calendar as we go along. We have made a gesture toward the scheduled 1992 next CSCE Review Conference in that we said we presently envisage a brief pause during a certain period of that conference when it will be discussing the CFE talks. But the duration of that pause is for the 23 to decide. We will not rise at some specific time before the Helsinki Review Conference. We will not stay adjourned until that conference is over by no means. These review conferences we know have gone on 2 and almost 3 years—Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna.

So that's one of the CSCE deadlines that we, I believe, effectively avoided. We also avoided any possibility of a direct veto, any possibility that there would be any substantive right on the part of any nonparticipant to pass judgment on the CFE outcome.

Representative **Fascell**. And so when the 35 meet in the normal process of a review conference, there is no right under the present arrangement or agreement for the 35 to inquire of the 23, "What have you done in the last 3 years?"

Ambassador **Ledogar**. The way your question is posed, Mr. Congressman, its a little bit difficult for me to give a categoric answer. We have granted, if you will, to the 12 non-aligned our agreement that we will discuss the 23 outcome, or report on progress, and that we will have a period where the 35 will discuss things. Naturally the 35 includes the 23 of us.

Representative **Fascell**. But the separation and the autonomy does not provide any mandate with regard to review by the 35.

Ambassador **Ledogar**. That's correct. And not only that, while it is conceivable that the 35 could take a decision if there were consensus at 35 about the future, if there's no consensus of the 35, the 23 will continue right straight through Helsinki and as long into the future as they, the 23, wish to do so.

Representative **Fascell**. Thank you.

That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Cochairman HOYER. Chairman, thank you.

Congressman Smith?

Representative SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Zimmermann, I would be interested in your views on the issue of religious freedom. In looking at your statement you point out that "Respect religious freedom, including the right to religious education." When we were in the Soviet Union during our meetings with the Supreme Soviet, it was announced to us, and it probably had been announced earlier, that the Soviets were going to change their Constitution to allow individual instruction of people within, apparently, the confines of their own home.

Would you consider that very modest step forward, as compared with allowing the teaching under the auspices of a school or a church, to be indeed a step forward but still a breach of the Helsinki Accords, particularly the Vienna Document?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, we would like to see it go much further and the Vienna Document provides for it going much further.

Representative SMITH. What means do we have to press them further on that case then?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, we have the traditional means. We have means within our bilateral relations and religious freedom is, of course, one of the major human rights within our bilateral relations. We have the ongoing CSCE process with a number of human rights meetings at which these issues will receive tremendous prominence. And we have the combined weight of our allies who feel very strongly about these issues and will also work very hard to get the Soviet Union and other countries to improve their approach to religious freedom.

Representative SMITH. As noted in your testimony, you mentioned the right to distribute religious material. Does that also include the right to produce, as well as to import?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, we think it does, yes.

Representative SMITH. Do they?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. We will see.

Representative SMITH. Should problems arise for an organization, and one comes to mind immediately—Open Doors with Brother Andrew, what is their recource? For instance, Brother Andrew has concluded an agreement with Metropolitan Filaret to import 1 million Bibles, and many have already been delivered. When problems arise, what can our Commission and our delegation do, not only in that specific case but others that might arise similarly?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, I think it's always useful, and you've been one of the people who have been in the forefront of this, in calling the Soviet Union to their obligations in these areas. I think the Vienna Document will give you a higher platform to stand on in doing this because the Soviets have made some commitments now on paper which they have never made before. Bringing religious publications into their country is one of them.

Representative SMITH. I was very encouraged earlier in the week when Secretary Baker said that our participation in 1991 was conditional because I think that provides added leverage for this country and our allies to keep the pressure on the Soviets. You did point out again in your testimony that for the first time all of the countries have agreed to access and openness, unfettered contact both in country as well as those traveling to country.

Given the Soviet Union's past performance which has been very poor in that regard, even families contacting families and the difficulties we've had over the years in many types of contact, what will we do to try to insure access by NGOs and individuals who want to travel, those who are living in exile, or perhaps those from the East bloc who would like to go as a group to Moscow to participate? What kind of mechanism is in place to insure that that kind of free flow will occur? And, what do we do if we find that they're not meeting that obligation?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, there's a black and white commitment in the document to all of these things. It's very specific. It's the very last paragraph in the document and it says that host countries for all meetings will effectively allow in anybody who wants to come and will let their own citizens participate and talk to the visitors and participate in the meetings themselves. So, the commitments are very far-reaching and very specific. If they are violated, the violation will be very clear for everybody to see.

Representative SMITH. Thank you very much.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you very much.

I want to welcome our new member from the House, Congressman Wolf from Virginia.

Congressman, we welcome you here as part of this body and we want you to participate as much as you possibly can. I've had the pleasure of serving with the Congressman on appropriation conference committees on many, many issues and he's a very diligent person. We're really pleased to have you here.

Cochairman HOYER. Mr. Chairman, will you yield?

Chairman DECONCINI. I yield.

Cochairman HOYER. I particularly, as the Co-chair from the House want to welcome my good friend and colleague, Frank Wolf, to the Commission. I think Bob Michel has made an excellent choice. Congressman Wolf replaces Congressman Kemp who, of course, is now at HUD. Congressman Wolf has been one of those, although not a member of the Commission, who has been deeply involved in and committed to the issue of human rights. He and Congressman Smith have worked together tirelessly with respect to religious liberties in particular. Romania has been a particular concern of Congressman Wolf's.

Mr. Chairman, he is going to make an excellent addition to our Commission. He is a committed, hard-working individual. You and both had the opportunity of serving on the Treasury Postal Appropriations Committee with him on the Senate and the House side.

Chairman DECONCINI. Frank, I want to welcome you to the Commission and say how pleased we are to have you with us.

Representative WOLF. Well, thank you very much. It's really a privilege and an honor to serve with you, Senator, with Steny and the Chairman and with Chris, who I've worked with. Someone once said if you got all the speakers in the world and laid them end to end you ought to just leave them that way. So, I won't say anything else, other than to say I am really honored and I promise publicly and to you personally, I will work extremely hard at anything and everything and cooperate to do what we can. So, thanks so much. I'm glad to be here.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Congressman.

Cochairman HOYER. We appreciate that, but we'd also appreciate your not quoting that unnamed source again. It doesn't sound to me like a friendly voice.

Chairman DECONCINI. Let me ask a question, Ambassador Zimmermann. The delegation certainly is to be commended for calling East European countries as well as the Soviet Union to task for their performance record that you did for a couple of years. Do you feel it was appropriate for the United States to agree to ending the Vienna Conference at the same time as police were assaulting peaceful demonstrators in a couple of those Eastern countries? How did you address that at that time?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, it was addressed by Secretary Shultz, Mr. Chairman, in a very, very strong statement condemning what was going on in Czechoslovakia.

I think what went on in Czechoslovakia while the ink was hardly dry on our agreement is a useful reminder to us all, that the Vienna Meeting did not settle the human rights issue. We did the best we could to highlight it, to provoke better compliance, to create a document which would give us a better lever for pushing for compliance in the future.

But most of the issues, I don't even say many of them, I say most of the issues of human rights remain to be settled and Czechoslovakia is one egregious example of that. There are many others.

The end of the Vienna is, in my view, not the end of anything because Vienna is unleashing a continuing process and an intensified process of further meetings, a new document which we can rely on and use as leverage, and in general a heightened awareness which Vienna contributed to in all of the member countries of the importance of human rights and particularly the importance of human rights and the relations between states.

Chairman DECONCINI. What should we do today or in the next 4 or 5 months toward, say, Czechoslovakia to bring pressure on these countries to comply with their Helsinki commitments? What is your best recommendation?

Ambassador ZIMMERMANN. Well, I think as public a program as we can make. Czechoslovakia, I think, is asking for it by the actions that they are taking. They talk as a government which wants better relations with Western countries. I think they have to be made to understand, both publicly and privately, that they aren't going to have better relations with Western countries as long as they pursue a policy of repression.

Chairman DECONCINI. Chairman Hoyer?

Cochairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador, one of the things that all of us have experienced in dealing with the Soviets is their discussion of our human rights performance. Let me ask you two questions on that.

The new language in the Vienna Document promotes efforts to achieve social and economic rights such as housing, employment, health and social security. In consideration of those, all of which are important objectives, was the feeling of the West that this was an attempt by the East to distract from what we had historically perceived as human rights performance and to shift to economic rights, collective sort of rights as opposed to individual rights that the East has tried to focus on?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think that is exactly what the East was trying to do. We would have all been much happier if the document did not have the references to economic and social rights that it had. This was part of the tradeoff. We got some very good language affecting a whole array of political and civil rights. And the price we paid for it was a heightened attention, not very much, but it was more than in previous documents to economic and social rights.

I think we did preserve the preferred focus on political and civil rights. We did not undermine in the language the Western position that political and civil rights are more important.

I would add a personal note. I'm not so worried about references to economic and social rights because I think this country and the Western democracies can compete extremely well against the Soviet Union and its allies on the terrain of economic and social rights. I'm perfectly prepared to compare any Western country with Romania, for example, in the degree of economic and social rights it gives its citizens.

So, I don't think we cost ourselves very much, although I do say we would have been happier if the language were less.

Cochairman **Hoyer**. I agree with you, Mr. Ambassador, and I would not limit it to the worst performer either.

Let me ask you about the NGOs as we're about to conclude this hearing. You mentioned, of course, the Helsinki staff and others. But my experience and that of Chairman Fascell has been that NGOs play a critical role in focusing attention on issues and bringing pressure to bear on delegations of other nations.

Was that your experience in Vienna? If so, are you urging the State Department to continue that as we move into what is now an unprecedented number of follow-up meetings between now and Helsinki?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. Mr. Chairman, the answer to both those questions is a resounding "Yes." I don't think it would have been possible to achieve whatever we achieved at Vienna without the perseverance and the pressure and the support of the nongovernmental organizations. There were organizations representing virtually every facet of the human rights area of the Helsinki process. They were continuously active through the whole period of the Vienna Meeting. I think it's absolutely essential that we in the executive branch, and the legislative branch as well, continue to utilize the efforts of these groups. I have already recommended that we continue to use to the extent we can the voluntary efforts of these remarkable groups.

Cochairman **Hoyer**. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of other questions. I know we're getting close to ending. We've invited a lot of people to come say hello to us, so we'd better do that.

Ambassador Ledogar, both Chairman Fascell and I have some concern, which our questions demonstrated, about the perceived autonomy and perhaps the very real autonomy of CFE. We're going to be looking very closely, as I know you are as well, as this process continues.

Clearly, MBFR was frustrating and the bottom came to naught. Just as clearly, all of us hope that this new forum will provide in its broader context, and particularly in the present political environment internationally, a greater opportunity for success. But we're going to be watching that, following it I think is the better word, very closely and we'll look forward to discussing that with you as the process unfolds.

Let me, Mr. Chairman, read from a document from the European addition of *Time*, which was called the Dance of the Dinosaurs. I refer to this document because this was the November 17, 1986 issue of *Time*.

The article closed by saying this, "Speaking at a press conference, Vladimir Bukovsky, a former Soviet dissident, called the Helsinki process 'a farce' and said that the agreement should be abrogated because it has been impossible to enforce. He accused the West of following a policy of appeasement.

"By contrast, Uri Orlov, a recently released Soviet dissident and one of the founding members of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, argued that the Soviet Union was capable of change. Said Orlov, 'I am an optimist. It was always my firm belief that the Helsinki process should continue.'

"As long as the dinosaurs continue to dance in Vienna, there may still be ground for hope."

Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Zimmermann, and Ambassador Ledogar, in my view, having followed closely the Vienna proceedings and having been included in some of them from afar and at times close, Vienna was a success Vienna was a ratification of a process that is not perfect but is historical in many ways. There really are few precedents for what was established in Helsinki in 1975, Mr. Chairman. I think the Vienna Document is a significant step forward. Ambassador Zimmermann in particular should be credited with excellent service to the process.

Many things, of course, surrounded the Vienna Review Conference. One was a dramatic, almost revolutionary change in the Soviet Union. In some respects rhetorical, but in other respects very real.

With the eight follow-up meetings and the two security conferences that will be going on, I think we in the United States and in the West have a continuing opportunity which creates an even stronger platform on which to pursue the interests of not just the West but all peoples in terms of human rights, economic relations and greater security.

As a result, I'm pleased to say that Ambassadors Zimmermann and Ledogar, who had a tough job to do, did it well, and moved us further along the road to a more secure, a more cooperative and, if I may, a kinder and gentler international community.

We must not delude ourselves by any stretch of the imagination that we are there. We are not. We have a long way to go. But I think Uri Orlov's optimism was justified in that November 17, 1986 statement. We have moved forward and this Commission, I know under Chairman DeConcini's leadership, will continue to work very closely with the administration and with NGOs in the private sector, to move it even further ahead.

Thank you very much.

Chairman **DeConcini**. Congressman Smith, do you have any further statement?

Well, thank you very much. I do want the record to note that the Commission will be sending a delegation to the opening of the military talks in Vienna. That will be, I think, on the 8th and 9th of next month. We hope that you're both there.

Will you be there, Ambassador?

Ambassador Zimmermann, you're going to be someplace else?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. I'm going to be in Yugoslavia.

Chairman **DeConcini**. Do you know who is going to take your place?

Ambassador **Zimmermann**. We're not sure yet.

Chairman **DeConcini**. OK. We look forward to working with them.

I want to thank all of you for being here today and again add the congratulations that Chairman Hoyer has given you. I also want to point out that this Commission has never been as active, I don't believe, from what I can gather from the history of the Commission, as it has in the last 2 years under this leadership. I think much of the credit for the success there goes to Steny Hoyer for his tremendous time and effort and knowledge that he's put into this. I'm sure you join me in complementing him.

We will now recess and go to the reception—I guess in the Dirksen Building, room 562, if I'm not mistaken. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the Commission adjourned.]

APPENDIX

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

HEARING: CONCLUSION OF THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING
and IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

February 23, 1989
2:30 - 4:30
226 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS BIOGRAPHIES

Warren Zimmermann: In May 1986, Warren Zimmermann became Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Vienna Review Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. From 1985 to 1986 he was Deputy to the head of the U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms. He was Deputy Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1980 and 1981 and Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow from 1981-84. He entered the Foreign Service in 1962 and has served in Belgrade, Caracas, Paris, Moscow, the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and was a speechwriter for the Secretary of State. Ambassador Zimmermann was a visiting Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (1984-84). He has recently been appointed to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

Steven J. Ledogar: Ambassador Ledogar served as U.S. Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Negotiations (MBFR) since September 1987. He had been Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative and Deputy Chief of Mission to NATO in Brussels since 1981. Since enterning the Foreign Service in 1959, he has served in Montreal, Milan, Vietnam, and was a press spokesman and member of the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks from 1969-72. Ambassador Ledogar was Deputy Political Adviser, U.S. Mission to NATO, 1973-76; special assistant to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, 1976-77; and director, Office of European Security, and Political Affairs, 1977-80. Ambassador Ledogar authored "European Defense Cooperation Outside the NATO Context: A U.S. View", published by the Atlantic Council of the United States. Most recently, Ambassador Ledogar was Chief U.S. Negotiater to the CST mandate talks in Vienna.

ANSWERS TO CSCE COMMISSION FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Submitted by Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar
U.S. CFE Delegation

April 11, 1989

Q. 1. The Warsaw Pact has been on the offensive if not in its military doctrine, then at least in terms of public relations. why is it that NATO always appears to be responding to an Eastern initiative?

A. 1. NATO need not be apologetic about its record. We must certainly combat any perception that the West is in a reactive mode, or that it is Secretary General Gorbachev who sets the agenda. The U.S. in particular needs to do a thorough job in educating publics, presenting its case in the media and choosing policies on their own merits not simply as counters to Soviet initiatives. But the plethora of initiatives announced by Mr. Gorbachev is in no small part due to the resolve that the U.S., in concert with the Atlantic Alliance, has shown in maintaining solid defenses and the real unity characteristic only of a democratic community. The Soviet Union has been taking steps to meet standards set by the U.S. and NATO e.g., in starting to reduce the enormous conventional military advantage it built for itself in Europe since the end of World War II. While positive steps should be welcomed and encouraged, we do not "owe" Moscow for beginning to amend its threatening stance.

Q. 2. The Budapest appeal outlined three options for future conventional arms negotiations. Why did NATO choose the CSCE option?

A. 2. The Warsaw Pact's "Budapest Appeal" proposed three options for the pursuit of new conventional arms talks: A reconfigured MBFR, CSCE or a new forum. It was NATO that decided to invite the East to negotiate a mandate for new talks which would be autonomous but which would take place in a unique forum within the framework of the CSCE process. This represented a compromise within the Alliance to accommodate France, which had refused to participate in the former MBFR talks because of its exclusively bloc-to-bloc character. The relationship of the CFE with the CSCE process also reflects NATO's recognition that military confrontation is the symptom and not the cause of the political division that has marked Europe in the post-war era. Linkage of the mandate to a balanced outcome from the Vienna CSCE meeting was instrumental in obtaining important CSCE objectives, especially in human rights. Now that CFE has begun, of course, there is no substantive linkage with CSCE issues.

Q. 3. Recently, the Soviet Union has released Warsaw Pact conventional deployment figures and has claimed a rough "parity" with NATO forces. How did they derive such figures and are they representative of "parity"?

A. 3. The Soviet Union has for years claimed that approximate parity exists between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, although recently-announced unilateral reductions implicitly recognize the Pact's superiority in armed forces. We do not agree that parity exists between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. As the November 1988 NATO document "Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts" demonstrates, the East has a significant advantage in all major categories. Unlike that document, the Warsaw Pact data release in January was not based on consistent, clear counting rules. The force comparison was skewed on several counts, such as the highly selective treatment of "Air Defense Aircraft" whereby thousands of Soviet aircraft were counted as defensive while NATO's were labelled as offensive. The Pact also counted NATO forces that are not based in Europe as well as naval forces that are inherently global systems and in any case excluded by the CFE mandate.

Q. 4. West German Foreign Minister Genscher seems to have embraced President Gorbachev's proposal to reduce troop levels on each side. Isn't the proposal similar if not identical to one tabled by the East at the MBFR? What is the U.S. reaction to the Warsaw Pact reductions and to the West German position?

A. 4. All the NATO Allies, including the FRG and Foreign Minister Genscher support the NATO proposal, which calls for increasing security and stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional armed forces. Our approach would result in troop levels being lowered as a consequence of the reductions of tanks, artillery and armored troop carriers, unlike the Eastern proposal, which calls for percentage reductions of manpower (also featured in some previous MBFR proposals). We have not proposed specific ceilings for manpower. Our experience in MBFR indicates that reductions based on manpower are complex and difficult to negotiate and represent an almost impossible verification challenge.

Q. 5. A dispute between NATO members Greece and Turkey over inclusion of the Port of Mersin in CFE negotiations almost delayed conclusion of the Vienna meeting. Though the CFE mandate remains somewhat ambiguous over the status of the port, Turkey claims to have the backing of both the U.S. and Soviets for not including the area in negotiations. What is the U.S. position on this dispute? Why have the Soviets taken their position?

A. 5. None of the CFE participants, apart from Greece, has challenged the Turkish interpretation of the mandate language on the demarcation of the area of application within Turkey. The area of Turkey which you mentioned is a tiny portion of the area in question, and it has no relevance in an East-West context -- a point on which the Soviet Union appears to agree.

Q. 6. Do you feel that an adequate balance between humanitarian and security concerns is represented in the Vienna concluding document? As CFE commences on a parallel track within the CSCE process, what assurances exist that balanced linkage will be maintained?

A. 6. I share the judgment of my colleague Ambassador Zimmermann that a balanced outcome was achieved in the Vienna concluding document. The results of the CFE talks will affect the security agenda in Europe for decades to come. We and our Atlantic Allies will of course need to deal with vital issues of our collective defense on their own merits.

Responses of Ambassador Zimmerman to CSCE Commisssion Inquiries

Q: During the past year or so we have seen a number of government sponsored "human rights groups" spring up in Eastern Europe. What approach should we take toward these organizations?

A: The past year witnessed the formation of two government-sponsored human rights groups in Eastern Europe: the "Human Rights Committee" in Bulgaria and the "Committee of the Czechoslovak Public on Human Rights and Humanitarian Cooperation" in Czechoslovakia. Both organizations are clearly government-sponsored although they claim to be non-governmental. Both organizations came to the fore at roughly the same time, November-December 1988.

The Bulgarian Human Rights Committee has attempted to garner legitimacy for itself by advertising contacts with international human rights groups such as International Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International. The Czechoslovak Commission has had contact with International Helsinki Watch and has also had marginal discussions with Charter 77 and Jazz section human rights activists. The Commission has also proposed potentially positive changes in the freedom of assembly laws.

It is clear, however, that both these organizations were created in an effort to co-opt the human rights movement in these countries by denying authentic human rights activists legitimacy as well as to deflect Western criticism. We believe, therefore, that our approach toward these organizations ought to be very cautious, realizing that they do not speak for human rights activists in these countries. We think this cautious approach should continue until and unless these organizations indicate a willingness to engage in a meaningful dialogue on human rights issues. This does not mean that we should refuse to meet with individuals who are members of these official organizations, but we should make clear to them our skepticism of the bona fides of their organization and insist on the right to meet as well with unofficial human rights representatives in these countries.

Q; Some experts have hailed the Vienna Concluding Document as a major advance in the field of human rights. What provisions are most significant in your opinion? Are there elements which we had hoped to have included at the outset but did not make their way into the final document? If so, do you foresee pursuing these elements at any of the intersessional meetings?

A: Adoption of the "mechanism" is arguably the most significant human rights provision in the Vienna Document. While earlier CSCE documents -- notably Helsinki and Madrid -- built a firm foundation of human rights commitments, no document -- until Vienna -- provided a formalized means to deal with signatories who failed to live up to their commitments.

One of our primary goals in Vienna was to develop proposals which would be vehicles for improved compliance, rather than just settling for new, generalized commitments. In this sense, the Vienna "mechanism" is genuinely revolutionary: by adopting the "mechanism" all 35 signatories agreed that each signatory has a legitimate interest in the human rights record of all other signatories. For many years we steadfastly argued that raising human rights concerns is not interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state; by adopting the "mechanism," the East can no longer hide its human rights offenses behind the false shield of sovereignty.

In Vienna the U.S. sought and achieved a balanced outcome in terms of implementation, textual proposals, and a fair mix of follow-up activities. While there were certainly additional provisions we would have liked to see in the Final Document -- for example, a specific time limit on the use of secrecy as a bar to emigration -- the final outcome in Vienna was considerably better than any of us would have believed possible when the talks began in 1986.

Q: In early December 1988 there was an attempt to forge a united Western position on the proposed Moscow meeting. What were the specific elements of the initiative?

A: Throughout the Vienna talks there was an ongoing effort to forge united Western positions on many important proposals. Coordination with our allies is essential to any successful outcome and Alliance cohesion and unity certainly played a key role in bringing Vienna to a successful conclusion.

As with most controversial issues, the Moscow conference proposal engendered considerable differences in perspective among our allies, and developing a united position required considerable effort on the part of all Allied delegations and governments. The united Western position that finally coalesced in December 1988 on the Moscow conference centered on those conditions that we had long demanded as the appropriate quid pro quo for a human rights conference in Moscow. These included guarantees of openness and access, as well as substantial improvement in the Soviet Union's human rights record [e.g., freeing of political prisoners, improvements in emigration, institutionalization of reforms, etc.].

Q: You have said that linkage between humanitarian and security elements is a vital element of the process. Isn't there a danger that the link between the two is being eroded over time? Given the fact that there will now be on-going meetings on military security and on the human dimension, what role will the main follow-up meeting, such as the one scheduled to take place in Helsinki, play in advancing human rights?

A: The linkage between humanitarian and security elements of the CSCE process remains strong and viable. The West cannot be confident of Eastern commitments in the security area as long as the Eastern commitment to human rights remains suspect. Progress in the one area is inextricably entwined with the other. We all recognize that the divisions that divide Europe are primarily political, not military. The military aspect is simply a by-product of the political division of Europe. We would make a serious mistake by seeking solutions solely to the military symptom of a divided Europe without addressing the political illness that pervades that continent.

This, fortunately, is not the case. There will be three human rights conferences over the next three years, as well as an Information Forum this month in London. These four conferences will keep human rights issues in the forefront -- where they belong. At the same time, we have begun new security negotiations in Vienna. Progress on one front -- if handled correctly -- should lead to progress on the other front. Progress on human rights will necessarily enhance the West's coinfidence in Eastern sincerity, while progress in the security field would further relax tensions and allow a more open atmosphere for progress in human and political rights in the East.

Even with eleven intersessional meetings between now and the Helsinki Follow-Up Conference in 1992, there will still be much to do in Helsinki. The intersessional meetings, other than those dealing with security issues, are not ongoing and are very limited both in time and scope. Helsinki will provide us an opportunity to assess fully and in considerable detail the progress -- if any -- made since Vienna in the areas of human rights, economic cooperation and mutual security.

Q: We commend the U.S. delegation for raising East European violations, as well as Soviet ones, during the implementation review. Yet it seems that the performance goals the U.S. chose in determining when it would be appropriate to end the Vienna meeting focussed solely on the Soviet Union. Why were goals such as the release of political prisoners not applied to Eastern Europe as well?

A: In fact, the West developed no performance goals in determining when it would be appropriate to end the Vienna meeting. The performance goals that were developed, which focussed entirely on the Soviet Union, set the criteria for our acceptance of a human rights conference in Moscow.

Q: You said that it is the failure of the East to comply with CSCE commitments which threatens the Helsinki process. Isn't the strength of the process determined by the weakest link? What is the impact on the process of recent events in

Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, GDR, and the ongoing situation in Romania? On the whole, would you say that the East European human rights record is better today than at the outset of the Vienna meeting?

A: The "weakest link" theory of viability is -- in the CSCE context -- inappropriate. The relationships developed during the last fourteen years cannot be accurately or adequately analogized to a linear strand of chain. Rather, the links forged between the 35 signatories are multiple and multi-directional. While weak links [i.e., poor performance] on the part of one or more members states may weaken the overall strength of the CSCE process, we would do well not to underestimate the dynamism and vitality of that process.

Today, in some of the Eastern signatory states, we see greater openness where rigid state control of thought and action long prevailed, while in other states, there is little or no progress -- even retrogression. Side-by-side we see progress, regression and stagnation. These conflicting currents of change in the East should have been expected: as the grip of totalitarianism loosens, there will inexorably be frantic efforts to regain control in some states, even as others quicken the pace of their reforms.

Of course, this state of flux cannot last forever. And perhaps the linear "weakest link" theory may be more appropriately applied to the totalitarian regimes that have dominated Eastern Europe since World War II. Perhaps the reforms now taking place in Poland and Hungary are the "weak links" in the East Bloc's rusting chain of repression.

Q: The United States has sought to encourage institutionalization of reform in the Soviet Union. How successful have we been in this regard and what can we do to press for more permanent change in the USSR? Has General Secretary Gorbachev's promise of institutionalized reform, as expressed in his UN speech in December 1988, been accepted as a sufficient guarantee of institutionalized reform?

A: We recognize that there is much yet to be done in the Soviet Union before that country meets acceptable and universal human rights standards. Of paramount importance for human rights in the Soviet Union is the institutionalization of the progress made to date. That progress is seen, for example, by the release of all prisoners convicted solely under the four "political/religious" articles of the criminal code, the liberalization of emigration policies, the greater tolerance of religious activity, and the improved opportunity for freedom of expression.

Chairman Gorbachev in his U.N. speech in December 1988 promised changes in law and regulation on a series of related issues. including codification of the above changes in practice and new laws on the press and judicial reform. We look to the Soviet leadership to follow through with its stated commitment to transform these changes into law. We have No intention of accepting at face value Soviet promises of legal reform without tying actions to words.

Although progress to date in institutionalizing reforms has been limited, one particularly encouraging sign has been the holding of multi-candidate elections in March for the People's Congress. The elections have the potential to usher in more complete and far-reaching reforms. With the election of the new Supreme Soviet in the fall, the legal structure for approving significant new legislation will be in place.

The pace -- indeed the necessity -- of institutionalization of reform is fundamentally determined by the Soviets themselves. The U.S. can and does encourage this process by reaching out to all levels of Soviet society in this period of greater openness. To that end, the U.S. continues to promote exchanges of information such as those which have already occurred among legal and psychiatric experts on both sides. The U.S. also seeks to encourage the institutionalization process through its role in the CSCE process, including our conditional agreement to attend a 1991 follow-on meeting in Moscow.

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